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Summary 
 
The thesis examines the contemporary conflict in the Central African Republic and its 
neighbouring countries, in particular the region comprising north-eastern Central African 
Republic, eastern Chad and western Sudan (the CCS-region). Having caused numerous 
civilian casualties and left countless societies entirely ruined, the conflict is one of major 
concern for the international community. The conflict is generally considered to be governed 
by the humanitarian legal framework of non-international armed conflict. It is however argued 
in the thesis that by categorizing the situation as a purely internal conflict intrinsic 
characteristics of the situation are ignored. 
Categorizing hostilities in terms of international humanitarian law necessitates 
an analysis of the actors involved in the conflict and the geographical scope of the same. 
Chapter 2 outlines the fundamental humanitarian framework and emphasizes that the 
application of humanitarian norms requires certain presuppositions; distinguishable armed 
forces and confined territories.  
Chapter 3 addresses the historical background to and practical context in which 
the conflict takes place. A result of European colonization of the CCS-region in the early 20
th
 
century was national coherency of the three states in theory, but fragmented communality in 
practice. All three states suffer from prolonged hostilities and it is argued that the CCS-region 
presents an intertwined and regionalized conflict embracing territories and actors from all 
three states. It is emphasized that the regionalized context in which the conflict takes place is 
difficultly compatible with the context required for correct application of humanitarian norms 
as both the requirement of distinguishable armed forces and the requirement of confined 
territories are essentially missing. By pinpointing that the conflict can neither be characterized 
as an international armed conflict, nor be easily accommodated within the framework 
regulating non-international armed conflicts, the chapter enlightens that characterizing the 
conflict and subsuming it under the international humanitarian framework is a challenging 
undertaking. The thesis finds that the conflict occurring in the CCS-region constitutes a from 
previously recognized conflict-typology distinguished type of conflict: a post-colonial 
regionalized conflict, difficultly compatible with the contemporary humanitarian framework.    
From the finding that the conflict constitutes a regionalized conflict it becomes 
extraordinarily difficult to distinguish who are and who aren’t the legitimate holders of the 
exclusive right to use violence and coercion within the states. It becomes difficult to hold 
persons and groups accountable for misconduct and potential war crimes, when simply 
characterizing the persons and groups involved in hostilities is in the nearest impossible. As a 
deplorable consequence it is found that severe crimes against the civilian population may not 
only go unpunished, but continue as it appears unclear who should, and has the exclusive 
right, to put an end to the violence.   
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Sammanfattning 
 
Uppsatsen analyserar den pågående konflikten i Centralafrikanska republiken och dess 
angränsande länder, med särskilt fokus på regionen omfattande nordöstra Centralafrikanska 
Republiken, östra Chad och västra Sudan (CCS-regionen). Med anledning av dess orsakande 
av avsevärda civila förluster och dess efterlämnande av åtskilliga förstörda samhällen utgör 
konflikten en betydande angelägenhet för det internationella samfundet. Konflikten anses 
generellt omfattas av det humanitärrättsliga ramverket för inomstatliga väpnade konflikter. I 
uppsatsen framförs dock argumentet att vid en kategorisering av situationen som en nationellt 
begränsad konflikt bortses från väsentliga aspekter av konflikten. 
Kategorisering av en strid i enlighet med international humanitärrätt kräver en 
analys av de involverade aktörerna och den geografiska omfattningen av konflikten. Kapitel 2 
presenterar det grundläggande humanitärrättsliga ramverket och belyser att tillämpningen av 
humanitärrättsliga normer erfordrar särskilda förutsättningar: urskiljningsbara väpnade 
grupper och avgränsade territorier.  
Kapitel 3 presenterar den historiska bakgrunden till och den praktiska kontexten 
i vilken konflikten pågår. Ett resultat av den europeiska kolonisationen av CCS-regionen i 
början av 1900-talet var nationell koherens för de tre staterna i teorin, men fragmenterad 
samhörighet i praktiken. Alla tre staterna har lidit av långvariga konflikter och det 
argumenteras i kapitlet att CCS-regionen utgör en sammanflätad, regionaliserad konflikt 
omfattande territorier och aktörer från alla tre staterna. Det belyses att den regionaliserade 
kontexten i vilken konflikten utspelar sig är tveksamt kompatibel med den kontext som 
förutsätts för korrekt tillämpning av humanitärrättsliga normer eftersom såväl kravet om 
urskiljningsbara aktörer som kravet om avgränsade territorier saknas. Genom att tydliggöra att 
konflikten varken kan kategoriseras som en internationell väpnad konflikt eller med enkelhet 
omfattas av ramverket för interna konflikter belyses att karakteriseringen av konflikten och 
tillämpningen av det humanitärrättsliga ramverket i enlighet därmed, är problematiskt. 
Uppsatsen konstaterar att den pågående konflikten i CCS-regionen utgör en från tidigare 
erkända konflikt-typologier särskiljd typ av konflikt: en postkolonial, regionaliserad konflikt, 
svårligen angripbar med tillämplig internationell humanitärrätt.  
Från slutsatsen att konflikten utgör en regionaliserad konflikt följer dock svåra 
bedömningar avseende vem som är och vem som inte är rättmätig innehavare av statens 
exklusiva, legitima rätt att utöva våld. Det blir svårt att utkräva juridiskt ansvar för potentiella 
krigsbrott när själva utpekandet av särskilda personer och grupper i sig är högst problematiskt. 
Uppsatsen avslutar med att konstatera att beklagansvärda konsekvenser av detta inte enbart är 
att allvarliga brott mot den civila befolkningen kan förbli ostraffade, utan dessutom tycks 
kunna fortsätta ohindrat då det förefaller oklart vem som borde, och vem som innehar den 
exklusiva rätten att sätta stopp för våldet.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aim and research question 
Multiple violations of international humanitarian law and (…) widespread 
human rights violations and abuses, including those involving extrajudicial 
killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, 
sexual violence against women and children, rape, recruitment and use of 
children and attacks against civilians, in particular but not limited to 
Muslims, and attacks against places of worship, denial of humanitarian 
access, committed by both former Seleka elements and militia groups, in 
particular the “anti-Balaka”.1 
 
Concerns expressed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2014 
summarize one of the main humanitarian challenges – not to say failures – of our time. 
Referred to as ‘the forgotten human rights crisis’2 the armed conflict in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) has previously been given scarce international attention. Having the last year 
furthered the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands residents, caused countless 
disrupted communities and left numerous societies entirely perished, the continuously 
sprawling conflict has now finally gained increased importance on the international agenda. 
The designation of the conflict as ‘a threat to international peace and security’3 and the 
forthcoming employment of a peace-keeping operation (MINUSCA) under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN) clearly stress the gravity of the situation.  
The complexity of the conflict cannot be ignored. Media repeatedly emphasizes 
the belligerency between Muslim and Christian communities.
4
 Although acknowledging the 
sectarian utterances of the hostilities, the conflict comprises significantly more intricate 
problems. Composed of critical historical and geo-political factors the religious aspect of the 
conflict is in fact nothing but a recent pretext for the prolongation of hostilities. Even though 
seemingly confined to the Central African Republic, the conflict has articulated consequences 
for and effects also on neighbouring states, not least Cameroon, Chad and Sudan.
5
 What has, 
contrary to the effects of the conflict, not been given significance in international reports are 
the underlying causes of the hostilities. These will be addressed in the present article.  
An inevitable consequence of analyzing the roots of the conflict is the questioning 
of the normative framework allegedly regulating the hostilities. Intentions to characterize the 
conflict in terms of international humanitarian law (IHL) as stated in the Geneva 
Conventions
6
 (GC) and its Additional Protocols
7
 (AP) reveals significant lacunas of the legal 
                                                 
1
 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), Adopted by the Security Council at 
its 7153rd meeting, S/RES/2149(2014), 10 April 2014. p. 2.  
2
 Human Rights Watch, “I can still smell the dead”. The Forgotten Human Rights Crises in the Central African 
Republic, New York, Human Rights Watch 2013, p. 1.  
3
 S/RES/2149(2014) [n 1] p. 5 and § 18 on p. 7. 
4
 <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25811250> Accessed 7 May 2014; 
<www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/05/us-centralafrica-fighting-idUSBREA440OW20140505> Accessed 7 May 
2014.  
5
 International Crises Group, ‘Policy Briefing, Central African Republic: Better Late Than Never’ (2013) 96 
Crises Group Africa Briefing, p. 7. 
6
 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of 
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framework. It highlights the insufficiency of the judicial field as the conflict in the region 
comprising north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western Sudan does not possess certain in 
IHL presupposed requirements.  
The examination evolves from and intends to answer two main research questions. 
Firstly: How to characterize the conflict in north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western 
Sudan in terms of international humanitarian law? Secondly: Is the historical context in which 
the conflict takes place compatible with the context required for correct application of the 
international humanitarian framework? 
In order to answer the research-questions, a number of interrelated sub-questions 
must be addressed: Who are the main parties involved in the conflict? What is the 
geographical scope of the conflict? Which are the alternative ways of characterizing conflicts 
in accordance with international humanitarian law? Does the conflict take place in a particular 
historical context? Does international humanitarian law require a certain context for its 
applicability? And finally, if the conflict does not take place in a context compatible with that 
required for correct application of the humanitarian framework, which consequences follow?  
The aim of the study is threefold: Firstly, to analyze the conflict sprawling in the 
Central African Republic and its neighbouring countries, as it constitutes an armed conflict of 
current actuality, presenting increasingly horrific crimes against humanity each day that 
passes. Secondly, to enlighten that international humanitarian law, stated in the Geneva 
Conventions, requires a certain context and certain underlying presuppositions for its 
applicability. Thirdly, to demonstrate that the conflict lacks such presuppositions and presents 
a context different form that required by the Geneva Conventions, thereby significantly 
challenging the humanitarian framework. By comparing the case-specific context in which the 
conflict takes place with the case-specific context required for appropriate application of 
international humanitarian law, significant incoherency will be enlightened.  
 
1.2 Material, method and delimitations 
In order to answer the research question stated above a number of interrelated steps must be 
taken. Primarily, the situation in the Central African Republic must, if possible, be 
categorized and defined, posing particular questions of international humanitarian law in 
relation to the characterization of conflicts. It will be argued in the present article that the 
conflict takes place in a regionalized context, rather than a purely internal or international 
setting. There are numerous academic sources available on the distinction between 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflicts. Literature providing for in-
depth analysis as well as academic journals broadening the scope of the subject has been 
reviewed in this regard. Sources referring to the concept of regionalization on the other hand 
are scarce within humanitarian literature. The notion of regionalized conflict can be found in 
certain academic articles, however none explicitly related to the field of international 
humanitarian law. Rather, the conceptualization is common within the field of peace- and 
security studies. Working for the prevention of conflicts and maintenance of peace, 
contributions by the International Crisis Group (ICG), International Peace Information 
Service (IPIS), the Crises States Research Centre (CSRC), the Human Security Baseline 
                                                                                                                                                        
Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949. 
7
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977. 
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Assessment (HSBA) and the Center for International Peace Operations (CIPO) provides 
important examples in this regard. Available sources consequently do not in particular 
concern the current field of examination and the analysis necessitates cross-fields 
considerations. While the focus of the article is the role of the humanitarian framework and 
the therein inherent dichotomy in a regionalized, post-colonial setting, the available sources 
are either related to other previously recognized versions of hybrid types of armed conflicts in 
the field of humanitarian law, or related to other academic studies such as the mentioned field 
of peace- and security studies. As a result, notions common to the sociopolitical field as well 
as ideas specifically common to African studies will be used and applied in a humanitarian 
setting in order to conceptualize different aspects of the conflict.  
When analyzing the social, political, economical and historical context in which 
the conflicts takes place it is thus inevitable to turn to other academic fields than that 
explicitly dealing with international humanitarian law. Works by professors of political 
science, general African studies and social anthropology provides valuable information on the 
situation and case-specific features of the conflict. With particular focus on the mentality and 
psychological characteristics of the militias active in the CCS-region, Marielle Debos, 
professor in political science makes an important contribution to understanding underlying 
tendencies of the sprawling, dynamic conflict. By reviewing the historical background to and 
socioeconomic context in which the conflict occurs the different parties involved will be 
pinpointed, providing for an understanding of the situation’s multifaceted character. 
In comparing case-specific characteristics of the conflict with typical aspects of 
other armed conflicts also challenging the humanitarian framework differences will be shown 
and the quaintness of the current conflict may be enlightened. A certain selection of conflicts 
from which the comparison may evolve has been required in this regard. As contemporary 
conflicts occurring in particular settings are characterized differently by scholars, practitioners 
and politicians with diverse underlying intentions, the categorizations and definitions may 
serve highly politicized purposes. More or less distinct objectives may be elucidated if 
sufficiently scrutinizing the way in which certain conflicts are framed. With the intention of 
providing an as neutral while at the same time comprehensive description as possible of 
different types of conflicts placed so to say in-between international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts, the typologies noted by Jelena Pejic, working for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has been chosen. The division and short 
description of the conflict typologies elucidates a wide spectrum of conflicts. Arguably, other 
ways of framing hostilities and belligerency may not unusually be possible to comprise within 
some of the hybrid typologies. The typologies will be used as a way of measurement. By 
reviewing and analyzing the case-specific characteristics of the current conflict in light of the 
characteristics of previously recognized conflict typologies, distinct differences will be 
shown. From this the conclusion can be drawn that the conflict presents yet another challenge 
to the humanitarian framework than those previously recognized. 
The legal framework employed will be confined to the Geneva Conventions, in 
particular Common Articles 2 and 3 and the Additional Protocols. Whether the weaknesses of 
the humanitarian framework shown by hybrid typologies may be overcome by the application 
of customary law, or if the categories actually enlightens deficiencies not easily rejected in 
practice is an ongoing and highly important discussion. Existence and whereabouts of 
customary law as such will however not be debated but assumed to support and recognize the 
legal principles discussed. In addition to treaties and academic literature, sources of value for 
the examination are reports by non-governmental organizations, of which the work by the 
ICRC and the United Nations’ actions are intrinsically interesting. Recent statements by the 
General Assembly (UNGA) and Secretary General (UNSG), as well as discussions by the 
Security Council on acute and future actions in relation to the Central African Republic are as 
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well important in this regard. The State Report from 2006 and responses by the Human Rights 
Committee (CCPR) provides an extended analysis on the situation in the Central African 
Republic. Further, reports by Amnesty International (AI), the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
and other non-governmental organizations add valuable non-judicial information, by directly 
addressing the current situation and recent history of the conflict.  
It must be emphasized that due to the widespread reports by media and non-
governmental organizations of the violence occurring in the Central African Republic, 
acknowledgements conducted by high-profile authorities within and outside of the region as 
well as statements by the UN and the UNSC; it is in the article assumed that the conflict 
unquestionably reaches the threshold of armed conflict within international humanitarian law. 
It will thus not be discussed whether the situation should be classified as merely internal 
tensions or occasional disturbances or given any other classification with regards to the 
intensity of the violence instead of being characterized as an armed conflict.   
With regards to international involvement in the conflict under examination, 
such will be confined to the involvement of the states in close proximity with or directly 
related to the CCS-region. Several international actors and organizations have had significant 
importance in the development and history of the conflict, for instance the actions and peace-
keeping operations (PKOs) by MISAB, MINURCA, BONUCA, FOMUC, MICOPAX and 
EUFOR. Notwithstanding the importance and consequences of their involvement, analyses on 
such operations lie beyond the scope of the present article. Specific methods and political 
sanctions employed by for instance the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) 
will neither be addressed.  
Focusing on the history of the Central African Republic, while simultaneously 
intending to pinpoint certain important aspects and particularities of the wider CCS-region, it 
should be acknowledged that an argument may be raised regarding a conflict of interests. If 
the intention is to analyze a region comprising areas of three different states, then what 
purpose does it serve to describe the history and context of merely one single state? While the 
intention of the present article is to elucidate the role of the international humanitarian 
framework in relation to the post-colonial regionalized conflict occurring in the CCS-region, 
alternative ways of presenting findings furthering theoretical conclusions may be discussed. 
The temporal and spatial extent of the work however requires certain delimitations. An all-
embracing analysis of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial judicial, political and 
military history of all three states would require extensive resources and lies beyond the scope 
of the present article. By enlightening specific actors and events of the CAR; characteristics of 
the CCS-region hence will be exemplified rather than comprehensively elucidated. Thus, 
while accepting alternative ways of addressing the problem, the present thesis will, by 
narrowing the study to one state, the Central African Republic, exemplify case-specific 
characteristics by which it is possible to elucidate tendencies of the complexity of the wider 
region.  
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2 Characterization of conflicts in 
accordance with IHL 
2.1 Crystallizing the problem 
The Central African Republic (CAR), being a former French colony, has suffered from years 
of prolonged war. Since independence in 1960, the state has faced numerous confrontations 
between opposing political parties and the governance has shifted repeatedly. Despite intense 
foreign involvement, the conflict has been and is still largely considered to constitute a 
conflict not of an international character. As such, the situation is mainly governed by the 
judicial framework of non-international armed conflicts. But by categorizing the situation as a 
purely internal conflict, intrinsic characteristics of the geo-political reality on the ground are 
left aside. Central Africa, for the present purpose referring to north-eastern Central African 
Republic, eastern Chad and western Sudan (hereinafter referred to as the CCS-region) still to 
this day is burdened with a heavy colonial legacy, apparent not least in the continuous 
involvement by former foreign colonizers, particularly France.
8
 Most obviously, the ever-
present post-colonial heritage is found in the states’ constant struggles for national coherency 
in accordance with territorial delimitations set by previous colonizers.  
Defining the situation in terms of IHL is however not as simple as bluntly 
characterizing it as an internal conflict. It is rather a quite challenging undertaking. The in 
IHL inherent dichotomy of international armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs) is rightly criticized among academics
9
 and in international jurisprudence
10
 
as it is no longer sufficient in the laws of armed conflict. In the words of for instance 
representatives of the ICRC: ‘the traditional dichotomy between international and non-
international (internal) armed conflicts does not quite match the complexity of modern-day 
constellations’.11 Likewise noted by Odermatt: ‘War is no longer a duel between competing 
states, but comprises a complex mix of internal and international elements, taking place in a 
globalized context involving an ever-greater number of state and non-state actors. In such 
conflicts, the traditional dichotomies upon which the law of armed conflict is based are simply 
outdated’.12  
That IHL may be argued to provide considerable, not to say immense, lacunas in 
terms of applicability has become inevitably apparent the last decade. The efficiency of the 
framework was righteously questioned after 9/11 and subsequent events and the need for a 
                                                 
8
 Noteworthy is that French troops were specifically authorized by the Security Council ‘to use all necessary 
means’ to support the forthcoming peace-keeping operation MINUSCA. S/RES/2149(2014) [n 1] § 47. 
9
 James G. Stewart, ‘Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A 
Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict’ (2003) 85[850] International Review of the Red Cross; Geoffrey 
S. Corn, ‘Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of 
Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40[2] Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law; David E. Graham, ‘Defining Non-
International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task’ in: Watkin K. and Norris A.J. (eds), Non-
International Armed Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, Vol 88 International Law Studies, Newport Rhode 
Island, U.S. Naval War College 2012,.  
10
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, (Appeals Chamber) 2 October 1995, (Prosecutor v Tadić, Interlocutory Appeal) para. 97. 
11
 Andreas Paulus, Mindia Vashakmadze, ‘Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict – a Tentative 
Conceptualization’ (2009) 91[873] International Review of the Red Cross, p. 100. 
12
 Jed Odermatt, ‘Between Law and Reality: ‘New Wars’ and Internationalised Armed Conflict’ (2013) 5[3] 
Amsterdam Law Forum, p. 31. 
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broad survey on possibilities to develop the regulations applicable to warfare and potential 
addition of new categories embraced by IHL has been repeatedly enlightened.
13
  The current 
examination does however not relate to a common, general questioning of the sufficiency of 
the humanitarian framework, as such have been elucidated by scholars, practitioners and 
academics since the very initiation and emergence of the same. Neither does it concern the 
discourse on the appropriateness of having a broad and in-depth judicial foundation for 
dealing with international armed conflicts compared to the scarce regulations pertinent to 
armed conflicts not of an international character, even though the latter has in fact 
outnumbered the previous considerably since the mid 20
th
 century.
14
 What is the focus of the 
present article is instead the fact that IHL presupposes a certain context for its applicability, 
which does not fit the circumstances in the CCS-region and that this furthers undesirable 
consequences. How the international humanitarian framework – and the therein inherent 
dichotomy of IACs and NIACs – applies to prolonged conflicts occurring in regionalized 
post-colonial settings is insufficiently elucidated in humanitarian doctrine. The current article 
therefore addresses this particular issue. In order to exemplify the problem in practical terms, 
the particular field of examination is that of the Central African Republic and the 
neighbouring states Chad and Sudan because of the regions endurance of precisely such a 
regionalized, prolonged post-colonial conflict.  
 
* 
 
When colonial powers forcibly comprised the CCS-region within linear cartographical 
boundaries set in accordance with their own preferences, distinct characteristics of the African 
societies were left unconsidered. Traditional ways of living contrasting the European societies 
in the late 19
th
 century with regards to communal, political and economic structures were 
ignored. That ethnicity rather than nationality, cross-border trade rather than internal 
economies as well as regional rather than national hierarchical association still make up 
important features of the societal landscape in the CCS-region is consequences of that 
ignorance and underlies every part of the prolonged conflict. As will be enlightened in chapter 
3; the European understanding of nation states did not and still does not fit the territorially, 
ethnically and socially dynamic region. The concept of nation states essentially emerges from 
the Treaty of Westphalia, concluded in 1648.
15
 At the time, the state ‘framed the respective 
component elements of territory, population, and government’.16 Noted by Hassan, the 
importance of territorial sovereignty: 
  
Was finalized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which is recognized as 
the first treaty of modern international law. It confirmed that within its own 
territory, each State is sovereign /…/ all Governments are the exclusive 
authority and their decisions and arguments are exclusively carried out 
within their territorial limit, as the concept of Westphalian sovereignty is tied 
                                                 
13
 Dale Stephens, ‘Blurring The Lines: The Interpretation, Discourse and Application of The Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (2009) 12 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law; Jelena Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of 
Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye’ (2011) 93[881] International Review of the Red Cross. Further 
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to State territory. According to territorial sovereignty, within a territory there 
is only one absolute temporal power, the Government of that territorial 
State.
17
 
 
In line with this, the authority to assert rights and duties over the population within a state lies 
exclusively within the powers of the Government, while the Government’s authority in itself 
is confined within the territorial borders of the state. From this territorially confined authority, 
the rights of the Government and state apparatus of using force and coercion within the state 
is drawn. Upholding of the rule of law, national security and control over civilians 
consequently lies exclusively in the hands of the Government of the sovereign state. This is in 
itself not a problem. But as will be illuminated, the conflicts occurring in eastern Chad, 
western Sudan and north-eastern CAR cannot be conceived of as three distinctly separated 
internal conflicts, but must rather be assessed as one, interrelated and regionalized conflict. 
Territorial boundaries are dynamic and porous in the CCS-region, challenging the very basic 
foundation for the territorial sovereignty discussed by Hassan. Further, neither governmental 
nor non-governmental armed forces are structured or merely engaged in hostilities confined 
within the territorial limits of one single state, but are spread over indeterminate territories and 
are engaging combatants with shifting loyalties. When the official militaries in the states are 
closely intertwined or practically mixed with the non-governmental militias functioning 
across national borders, ascertaining who the righteous holder of the exclusive right to use 
violence in the conflict is; is extremely difficult.  
As contemporary international humanitarian law relies upon this Euro-centric 
Westphalian idea – and the inherent dichotomy of purely national and international wars – the 
regionalized conflict is questionably compatible with the normative framework. Not only is 
the conflict theoretically difficult to address from an academic’s perspective as the main 
presuppositions for conflict-assessments in accordance with the available IHL framework are 
lacking; the presuppositions being those of clearly delimited international entities, distinct 
populations, coherent governments and nationally confined armed forces. An even more 
important consequence is that the conflict presents practical difficulties regarding the 
allocation of legitimate use of violence and the designation of accountability in cases of 
misconduct. Diane Davis’ social theory on irregular armed forces and fragmentation of 
sovereignty will be proven to have clear accuracy in relation to the conflict in the CCS-region:  
 
Non-state armed actors in imagined communities pose a challenge to 
national-state sovereignty and to the state’s capacity to monopolize the 
means of coercion /…/ Over time, de facto bonds of commitment develop 
among families and nearby neighbors, who operate as a fragmented set of 
constituencies each with their own coercive force /…/ Connections and 
loyalties to state – or at least to the police and legal institutions charged with 
the de jure capacity for protection and justice – diminish. Such developments 
not only undermine the state’s effective sovereignty and its legitimate 
capacity to dispense justice and guarantee a rule of law; they also make it 
more difficult for the state to solve problems of violence, in no small part 
because it is increasingly less clear who has the legitimate right to provide 
security.
18
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By acknowledging that the conflict in the CCS-region can neither be addressed with the 
dichotomy of IAC/NIACs due to the in IHL presupposed Westphalian context from which 
certain required presuppositions steam, nor can be comprised within any hybrid version of 
non-international armed conflict established by previous scholars – as also the latter requires 
the same presumptions – the conclusion can be drawn that the situation in the CCS-region 
presents a certain type of conflict distinct from the in IHL-doctrine previously debated. The 
conflict enlightens an additional applicability-gap of the IHL framework with undesirable 
consequences; unclear possession of the exclusive right to use violence within a state and 
difficulty in allocating accountability for misconduct and war crimes.  
 
2.2 A regionalized conflict 
Situated in the heart of the African continent, the Central African Republic is currently in 
what appears to be a state of complete chaos. Suffering from years of internal disturbances 
and a deplorable humanitarian situation, the year of 2013 and the beginning of 2014 gave 
evidence of increased social deterioration. By using the notion of ‘catastrophic’19 the previous 
Prime Minister of the CAR, Nicolas Tiangaye acknowledged that the situation in the country 
was about to spin out of control before the UNGA already in September 2013. Not merely 
requesting the international community to act and react upon the escalating national violence, 
Tiangaye emphasized the risk of the conflict spreading outside of the country, potentially 
destabilizing a wider African region and forming a foundation for ‘new criminal and terrorist 
networks’.20  
Comprising 9000 villages organized into 16 dynamic provinces CAR’s societal 
organization is multifaceted. With a population of 4,6 million people of diverse ethnic origin 
the amount of persons in acute need of humanitarian aid as a result of the recent conflict 
which reached 2,2 million in April 2014 constitutes a considerably percentage of the 
population
 
.
21
 Not only has a major quota of the population been internally displaced with all 
the dire consequences following, countless civilians have died as a result of deliberate killings 
or indirect causes of the conflict and dozens of villages have been pillaged or entirely 
ruined.
22
 Hundreds of thousands are lacking access to food, water and sanitation, thousands of 
children are estimated to have been recruited into irregular armed militias and sexual violence 
is sprawling without apparent hindrance.
23
 Addressing the situation in November 2013 the 
Deputy UNSG Jan Eliasson stated:  
 
The population is enduring suffering beyond imagination. As we see far too 
often, women and children are bearing the brunt. Human rights violations are 
mounting. The use of child soldiers is rising. Sexual violence is growing. 
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There are widespread reports of looting, illegal checkpoints, extortion, 
illegal arrests and detentions, torture and summary executions (…) The CAR 
is becoming a breeding ground for extremists and armed groups in a region 
that is already suffering from conflict and instability. If this situation is left 
to foster, it may degenerate into a religious and ethnic conflict with 
longstanding consequences, a relentless civil war that could easily spill-over 
into neighbouring countries.
24
 
  
Mr. Eliasson pinpoints several important issues, in particular by emphasizing that not merely 
ethnical but also religious factors are prevailing in the conflict. A division among the 
population has recently taken an increasingly religious aspect; Christianity and Islam are used 
as pretexts for a continuation and evolvement of the confrontations between armed groups 
within the territory. Clashes along religious lines are however by no means a particularity of 
the conflict in the CAR and the recent turn taken must necessarily be conceived of as merely a 
new expression of the underlying instability of the state. Rather than particularly focusing on 
the sectarian utterance of the ongoing conflict, even though acknowledging its significance, 
the main attention should instead be given Mr. Eliasson’s very last finding. The last sentence 
recognizes the possibility of the risk of the civil war spilling over into states bordering the 
CAR, also noted by Mr. Tiangaye. Notwithstanding this bluntly accurate analysis, it arguably 
enlightens the problematic situation from a questionable perspective.  
Initially, it may well be discussed whether the concept of civil war is at all 
applicable to the violence sprawling in a territory lacking clear boundaries. Referring to 
insurrectional uprisings within a nationally bound, demarcated area the concept hardly 
comprises the multifaceted dimensions of the present conflict. On the same line, assessing the 
situation as a case of a spill-over war, no matter the correct terminology, means pointing out 
domestic disturbances as the cause having international consequences as a side effect. This is 
a misleading and simplifying explanation of the actual events taking place. Especially so since 
violent clashes are and have for many years sprawled in the surrounding states as well, not 
least in the Darfur region of western Sudan. In the following, the starting point will thus not 
be that of Mr. Eliasson, approaching the conflict from a classical Western perspective. 
Instead, the analysis evolves from the idea that the prolonged war cannot be considered to be 
confined within cartographic borders and the roots of the conflict are not all related to the 
domestic affairs of a single state.  
With the intention of using an alternative terminology for defining the conflict 
under study; conceptualizing the situation as a ‘regionalized conflict’25 rather than as a civil 
war (or more accurately under the framework of international humanitarian law as a ‘conflict 
not of an international character’26) is efficient. Using this broader definition, Giroux et al 
have presented an examination on important features underlying the complexity of the case.
27
 
By using the notion ‘The Tormented Triangle’28 the authors examined the region comprising 
eastern Chad, north-eastern Central African Republic and Darfur in the western Sudan. The 
study’s main focus related to the non-domestic character of the wars occurring in each state, 
arguing that the conflicts sprawling in the three countries ‘have become so interwoven that 
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they form one system of conflict rather than three distinct conflicts’.29 The idea of a 
necessarily regionalized approach to the conflicts is shared by several practitioners and 
academics, in particular in the fields of peace- and security studies.
30
 In order to use a more 
neutral wording than ‘The Tormented Triangle’, the region of eastern Chad, north-eastern 
CAR and western Sudan will as mentioned be referred to as the CCS-region.  
When assessing the conflict, the situation must arguably be addressed from 
another perspective than that of Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Tiangaye among others. It cannot be 
stated that the problems of the region have merely emerged from internal disputes and 
tensions. Taking into consideration the geographical, historical, political and ethnical 
interlinking bonds of the territory and population in the CCS-region, previous authors and 
scholars have accurately found that the contemporary war is a consequence of several 
international and regional factors rather than a result of merely domestic causes. To argue that 
the sprawling war in the CAR is nationally delimited, without any further interaction with the 
conflicts occurring in the surrounding countries other than in the form of a potential risk of 
the conflict spilling over to the latter due to its proximity, is ignorant. If anything it is a 
regionalized conflict having domestic consequences rather than the other way around. The 
analysis must therefore take a stand in the inter-communal dynamics of the population in the 
CCS-region as well as the traditional and nomadic ways of living without static borders, 
practiced for generations in order to efficiently assess the context in which the contemporary 
conflict takes place. Practical and concrete issues must be taken into account such as weather 
conditions and the proximity of the provinces compared to the considerable distance from the 
hinterland to the capitals as the places for domestic governance. These and other factors are 
analyzed in chapter 3.  
Approaching the situation from the perspective presented by Giroux et al, as a 
regionalized conflict, is summarily the most appropriate. Notwithstanding the unambiguous 
reasons for this, which will be further addressed later on, adapting the idea of characterizing 
the situation as a regionalized conflict inaugurates several difficulties, especially in relation to 
international humanitarian law. Describing the clashes occurring in the CAR as events parts 
of and indicative of an all-over hostile environment taking place in the CCS-region, or as a 
‘manifestation of a process of armed regionalization that has connected the crises in Darfur, 
eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR’31, as such is hardly difficult. What makes the idea 
problematic is the application of legal rules and the characterization in terms of international 
law. As the concept of regionalized conflict is unknown to the framework of IHL, which 
instead deals with purely inter-state and intra-state conflicts the mere classification of the 
situation in the CCS-region poses difficulties.  
 
2.3 International and non-international armed 
conflicts 
Having the intention to elucidate the conflict currently sprawling in the Central African 
Republic it is inevitable to initially review a very basic dichotomy of the humanitarian legal 
framework. Any contemporary assessment of armed conflicts evolves from the 
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characterization of a situation as either inter-state or intra-state. Summarily recapturing the 
provisions regulating situations of armed conflict is therefore useful before any further 
examination of the implications attached thereto. Even though the framework of IHL 
comprises numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties, conventions and declarations
32
, the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 make up the legal 
framework essentially addressed here. For further notice, the Central African Republic has 
been a party to the Geneva Conventions since 1966 and to the Additional Protocols I and II 
since 1984.
33
 The Common Articles 2/3 – paradigm defines the material field of application 
and produces and enlightens the dichotomy from which several difficult assessments of 
contemporary conflicts arise. 
 
2.3.1 GC CA 2 and AP I 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them.
34
  
 
Geneva Conventions Common Article 2 (GC CA 2), intended to obviate former concerns on 
the applicability of the framework of IHL, such as the pre-1949 non-applicability of the 
regulations in cases where no formal initiation of war had been declared or in cases when 
either of the parties did not officially recognize the belligerent as a sovereign state, sets the 
requirements for applicability of the Geneva Conventions at an objective level.
35
 Rather than 
meeting subjective opinions, CA 2 and the thereto attached set of humanitarian norms thus 
applies straight from the objective initiation of an armed conflict between two High 
Contracting Parties, without the need for any solemn declaration of war. As such, the 
initiation of CA 2 and the broad judicial framework attached thereto requires the existence of 
an armed conflict between two international subjects defined as states. While the notion of 
armed conflict has not been defined or specifically regulated, the words nevertheless are of 
importance for any examination relating to international humanitarian law and the laws of 
armed conflict. Explained by the ICRC: ‘any difference arising between two States and 
leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 
2’.36 In relation to this, the notion of armed forces should be understood in a broad sense and 
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the duration of the conflict or the number of casualties is of no importance for the existence of 
an armed conflict.
37
  
While one of the pillars in the inauguration of an international armed conflict is 
the objective existence of an armed conflict, the other pillar is the internationalization of the 
conflict in the meaning that the parties to the conflict are two or more international subjects in 
the sense that they are sovereign states. Without comprehensively elucidating the multifaceted 
dimensions of the concept of statehood in this particular setting, it may summarily be noted 
that international subjectivity is a highly contested and undefined. Nevertheless, the notion of 
statehood will inevitably have to be addressed later on, as colonization and decolonization is 
closely related to the notion of statehood.  
In sum, when the armed forces, understood in a wide sense, of two distinct 
entities conceptualized as international subjects in the form of states, are in a violent 
confrontation with each other, CA 2 of the Geneva Conventions is activated. As will be 
enlightened, contextualizing the conflict in the CCS-region as an international armed conflict 
in accordance with GC CA 2 and applying the attached regulatory framework is inaccurate. In 
relation to Geneva Conventions Common Article 2, Additional Protocol I (AP I) Article 1 
should also be mentioned:  
 
This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 for the protections of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred 
to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.
38
 
 
Emphasized in the Commentary to Additional Protocol I is the supplementary function of 
Article 1 in the Protocol. ‘This paragraph literally repeats Article 1 common to the 
Conventions’.39 As it will be clear that the conflict under examination cannot be characterized 
as an international armed conflict in accordance with Geneva Conventions Common Article 2 
and AP I Article I mainly reiterates the regulations therein, it will not be given further 
attention.  
 
2.3.2 GC CA 3 and AP II 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions.
40
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In the case under examination – as in numerous other situations – the parties involved in the 
confrontations may not be subsumed under the characterization of international subjects in the 
commonly understood sense. Contemporary conflicts does not unusually involve multiple, 
highly diverse parties, of which a great amount does not entail international subjectivity. More 
or less organized militias and fractions of armed forces have gained increasing importance on 
the international agenda. The confrontations today often involves opposing non-governmental 
militias or concerns states’ confrontations with uprising rebel groups, rather than purely inter-
state clashes. Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 (GC CA 3) is intended to regulate such 
situations involving subjects not appropriately subsumed under the characterization within 
Common Article 2.  
Regarding CA 3 there are three main requirements for applicability. There must 
exist an armed conflict, it may not be international in character and it must be confined within 
the territorial borders of one single state, a High Contracting Party. The applicability of the 
article is by no means dependent on formal agreements. Like the previously mentioned article, 
CA 3 applies objectively and automatically when the requirements stated therein are fulfilled. 
As noted in relation to CA 2, the notion of armed conflict has not been defined within the 
framework of international humanitarian law, thus the same uncertainty as to the content of 
the concept as found relating to CA 2 applies to CA 3. In fact, as the armed conflict cannot be 
of an international character, the expression provides an even greater challenge. Even though 
criticized for being way too vague the concept was not explicitly elucidated by the drafters of 
the Geneva Conventions. While at the time of ratification suggestions on potential 
clarifications of the expression included for instance the necessity for a rebel group of having 
an organized military force or the requirement that the militia controlled certain parts of the 
territory; no such exemplification was enacted.
41
 Nevertheless, the examples may serve as 
indicative presuppositions for a characterization of armed forces as well as for a 
differentiation between armed conflicts within the meaning of CA 3 and other situations of 
internal instability not reaching the threshold of violence required for applicability of CA 3. 
These exemplified presuppositions will be addressed in section 3.5.2 as they acknowledge and 
support the argument stated in the present article.  
A favorable view, as presented by the ICRC suggests that the article should have 
the widest field of application possible, as no disadvantageous effects can be related thereto. 
The main fear raised with regards to a broad applicability of the article relates to the risk that 
the application of CA 3 in certain cases would imply acceptance of uprising rebel groups as 
legally recognized subjects under international humanitarian law and thereby affording the 
members of the militia the privileges attached to that characterization.
42
 Notwithstanding the 
interesting features of such reasoning, the issue is not of particular focus in the present 
examination. Even so, it may shortly be recognized that the application of the rules within 
Common Article 3 does not affect the legal status and characterization of the parties to the 
conflict. An important aspect of Common Article 3 on the other hand is the fact that the rules 
therein applies to all parties to the conflict, even if one of the parties is not a High Contracting 
Party to the Geneva Conventions. When there exist different parties, and there has occurred 
an armed conflict between them within a High Contracting Party, the regulations in Common 
Article 3 applies to all parties involved, whether or not they are subjects able to commit to 
international obligations.
43
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Similar to applying the regulatory framework attached to Common Article 2 to the 
present conflict, is it inaccurate to subsume it under the umbrella of Common Article 3 as the 
basic premises for its appropriate application are missing. Stated above, AP I supplements and 
principally reiterates the norms regulated in GC CA 2. In this aspect, the field of application 
for Additional Protocol II (AP II) in relation to GC CA 3 is different. AP II not merely 
supplements GC CA 3, but develops and supplements the regulations:  
 
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing 
conditions of applications, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not 
covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) and which takes place in the territory of a 
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces 
or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.  
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
44
 
 
While GC CA 3 is difficulty applied in several circumstances, as in the present, AP II 
provides for an even narrower field of application, ‘the threshold is higher under Additional 
Protocol II’45 as the article explicitly requires non-governmental armed forces engaged in a 
conflict not of an international character to be organized, have responsible command, exercise 
certain territorial control and have the means to implementing the Protocol. Neither of the 
criteria is sufficiently fulfilled and the Protocol will not be elucidated further.  
 
2.4 Hybrid typologies of non-international armed 
conflicts 
Having reviewed the basic foundations from which conflict-assessments in accordance with 
available IHL norms evolves, (‘the traditional Geneva Convention-based law-triggering 
paradigm’46) it is inevitable to note the narrow sphere of application they present. While it is 
assumed in this particular setting that the level of violence occurring in the CCS-region is 
sufficiently serious as to reach the threshold of applicability, namely that it reaches a level of 
protracted armed violence
47
, based on reports by the UN
48
 HRW
49
 and AI
50
; the requirements 
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on the actors involved and the geographical sphere of a conflict set by the Geneva 
Conventions are problematic in relation to the present case. Noted in section 2.1, the conflict 
is generally considered to constitute a conflict not of an international character, but as will be 
enlightened in chapter 3; neither the territorial nor the personal requirement for NIACs is 
fulfilled in the conflict sprawling in the CCS-region.  
However, international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts 
does no longer present a clear-cut polarized figure, but rather a non-linear scale with diffusely 
escalating or fading aspects of armed conflicts and involved parties. When concluding that the 
basic premises under the IAC/NIAC-dichotomy cannot sufficiently address the case-specific 
regionalized conflict it becomes relevant to examine alternative ways of contextualizing the 
situation. Discussing extraordinary versions of non-international armed conflicts is then of 
interest.  
Noted in section 1.2 Jelena Pejic has presented a scheme of such armed conflict-
typologies with diverse characteristics beyond and in between the obvious scope of the 
Common Articles 2/3-paradigm in the Geneva Conventions.
51
 They are all what can be 
referred to as hybrid versions of non-international armed conflicts as they all evolves from the 
idea of conflicts somehow originating from within a distinct state. Each and all present 
challenges to the available humanitarian framework, more or less acknowledged in legal 
doctrine. It should be noted that the importance of this section lies not in the pinpointing of 
general lacunas within the humanitarian framework, as such have been previously elucidated 
by among others Graham
52
, Corn
53
, Odermatt
54
 and Buckley
55
. Rather, by review of and 
comparison with common perceptions of diverse conflicts posing problems to and challenging 
the humanitarian framework the argument stressed in this article – that the conflict in the 
CCS-regions presents a differentiated, distinct type of conflict – finds essential support.  
Firstly, it should be noted that armed violence between governmental armed 
forces and non-governmental armed forces within a particular state constitute the main 
‘traditional’56 field of application for the humanitarian framework regarding conflicts not of 
an international character. Embracing political insurrection, rebellion and military opposition 
such conflicts are not unusually expressions of the intention to overthrow a state’s 
government or an expression of a group’s willingness to form a distinct and independent 
society. Emphasized by Karlshoven and Zegveld; GC CA 3 applies to ‘all’57 such conflicts 
not of an international character, as long as the conflict occurs within the territory of one 
single state.  Even if looking beyond or ignoring the fluid loyalties of the non-governmental 
groups discussed in chapter 3 and the dynamic features of the armed forces engaged in the 
hostilities within the CCS-region, the situation in the CAR and the wider CCS-region is 
inappropriately subsumed under this umbrella. The main problem regarding this traditional 
typology in relation to the conflict in the CCS-region – which is a common issue for other 
types as well – is the requirement that the conflict be confined within the territory of one state.  
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The second typology includes a couple of different scenarios, none of which is 
conveniently applicable to the case at hands. One situation would be that of a state lacking 
clear governance due to its partial or complete failure of national control, with diverse non-
governmental groups gaining increased geographic, political, military and social control over 
the state; referred to as ‘the failed state scenario’58. Stating that the CAR is a failed state may 
as such not be controversial. When governmental finances, basic education, health care and 
infrastructure are consistently deficient
59
 and the security situation for civilians is deplorable 
to say the least, the failed state scenario may in fact present a tenable characterization. 
However, as with the first typology and the second of the alternatives in the present category, 
that of a ‘parallel occurrence of a non-international armed conflict between two or more 
organized armed groups alongside an international armed conflict’60 the conflicts discussed 
are such as takes place within the territory of one state. Already noted and as will be 
illuminated later on, the current conflict cannot be conceived of as being comprised within the 
territorial boundaries of one single state.  
Being the first typology to acknowledge that internal conflicts may have 
consequences outside the territory of one single state; the third category concerning ‘spill 
over’61 conflicts is the first to be somewhat relevant for the present case. However, Pejic does 
not explain the concept any further than noting that ‘certain NIACs originating within the 
territory of a single state between government armed forces and one or more organized groups 
have also been known to “spill over” into the territory of neighbouring states’62. Even though 
potential effects on surrounding areas area acknowledged, the category thus also takes a 
starting point in the idea that the conflict has internal roots, and that the causes of the conflicts 
are in essence national, intra-state. As such, arguing in favor of characterizing the conflicts 
prevailing in north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western Sudan as three distinct and 
separate conflicts which may spill over to each other illuminates the precise ignorance noted 
in section 2.1.  As the main idea of the present article is that the conflict in the CCS-region 
must be addressed from another perspective, namely that it must take a starting point from 
within the regionalized, common characteristics of the CCS-region, embracing areas of all 
three countries which have been disrupted by colonial interference, rather than being 
approached from outside, which this category as well as several others do, the typology of 
spill over conflicts is inconvenient for the case at hands.  
The fourth typology, and simultaneously the second of moderate interest for the 
conflict under consideration, concerns ‘cross border’63 conflicts. Such conflicts ‘exists when 
the forces of a state are engaged in hostilities with a non-state party operating from the 
territory of a neighbouring host state without that state’s control or support’64. The 
belligerency between Israel (‘the forces of a state’) and Hezbollah (‘non-state party’) 
originating and acting from Lebanon (‘neighbouring host state’) has been alleged to present 
an eligible example of this conflict-typology.
65
 Notwithstanding the transnational character of 
such wars, the cross border characterization also upholds the underlying state-centric 
presuppositions forming the basis of IHL just like any other typology familiar to the 
humanitarian framework. It enlightens borders between nations, for instance between Israel 
and Lebanon and emphasizes the state-transgressing character of clashes and parties involved. 
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Displayed in chapter 3; the CCS-region does not present a territorial and human context 
corresponding to such trans-boundary simplification and is thus inadequately characterized 
under the cross border typology.  
Two additional categories relates to involvement of multinational forces into 
internal conflicts, basically in the form of PKOs. While situations when ‘armed forces are 
fighting alongside the armed forces of a host state – in its territory – against one or more 
organized armed groups’66 are referred to as a ‘multinational NIACs’67, the sixth typology 
constitutes ‘a subset of multinational NIACs’68 engaging military personnel instead employed 
by an international organization such as the UN or the AU. Notwithstanding the fact that both 
versions of international engagement have taken place in the CAR and the CCS-region, none 
of the categories lie within this study’s sphere of examination.69 Likewise is the last of Pejic’s 
typologies irrelevant in the case at hands as the conflict in the CCS-regions is not specifically 
connected with the so called ‘global war on terror’70.   
Summarily, the typologies in IHL discourse of potential relevance are the spill 
over and the cross border categories. However, neither of them nor any of the other categories 
noted sufficiently recognizes the arguably case-specific characteristics of the CCS-region. All 
hybrid versions of non-international armed conflicts evolve from the idea of clearly delimited 
territories and somewhat distinct actors and parties. Thus, they all have the same conceptual 
starting point as the very basic IHL dichotomy in the Common Article 2/3-paradigm. In the 
words of David E. Graham, who has addressed the problematic field of application of 
humanitarian regulations to non-international armed conflicts: ‘it is essential to recognize that 
(…) discussion regarding the nature and scope of non-international armed conflicts has 
centered on violence – that is hostilities – occurring within the boundaries of a State’.71  
It is nevertheless important to note that other, additional typologies and hybrid 
versions of NIACs have been discussed in international jurisprudence and legal discourse than 
those already mentioned, especially the concepts of asymmetrical wars, transnational wars, 
mixed conflicts and internationalized internal armed conflicts. Due to the general character of 
the concept ‘asymmetrical war‘72 which arguably embraces one or several of the above 
mentioned typologies it will not be specifically addressed here. The same goes for the notion 
of ‘transnational armed conflicts’73 discussed by for instance Graham and Corn. 
‘Internationalized armed conflicts’74 noted by Stewart and the concept of ‘mixed conflict’75 
introduced by the ICTY in the Tadić-case76 on the other hand must be given some attention. 
One of the main concerns in relation to such characterizations is the extent of military and 
financial support provided by one state party to non-governmental groups acting in another 
state in order to internationalize an otherwise internal conflict.  
Already in the Nicaragua-case
77
 was there a discussion on the potential 
internationalization of the conflict – which finally was characterized as being not of an 
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international character
78
 – due to the involvement by the USA in the conflict in Nicaragua 
through support to the contras. According to the ICJ, for a state (the USA) to be responsible 
for acts committed by paramilitary forces (the contras) within another state (Nicaragua) and 
for the conflict thereby to have an international character, the state would have to have 
‘effective control’79 over the armed forces.  
It was similarly clarified that an internal conflict may be characterized as 
internationalized by either a state’s interventions with its concrete military troops or through 
active participation by combatants on behalf of the intervening state in an otherwise internal 
conflict, in the trial in the ICTY against Tadić.80 The Appeals Chamber in the Tadić-case 
overruled the effective control – criteria established in the Nicaragua-case and instead 
implemented the criterion that the intervening state should have ‘overall control’81 over the 
militias involved in the otherwise internal conflict.  
While it was stated in the Tadić-case that the intervention by troops of a State may 
internationalize an otherwise internal conflict in another state, it was added in the Blaski´c-
case
82
 that such intervention could be proved factually. It was shortly concluded that 
involvement of 3000 – 5000 Croatian soldiers was enough to internationalize the conflict 
occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
83
 Similarly, the Kordi’c & Cerkez-case84 confirmed 
that even indirect Croatian involvement, in the form of placing troops in places of ‘strategic 
importance’85 had the effect of internationalizing the conflict. Finally, the Naletili’c-case86 
affirmed that the conflict ‘must be looked upon as a whole’87.  
Notwithstanding the confirmations of the Tadić-principle in the Blaski´c, Kordi’c 
& Čerkez-case and Naletili’c-case, they did little to expound on or explain the amount of 
involvement required for an intervening state to turn an internal conflict into an international 
one. The understanding of the overall control criterion in the Tadić-case therefore has 
continuous validity.  
There will be reason to come back to the requirements set by the criterion later on. 
If fulfilled, the criterion could have the effect of internationalizing the conflict under 
consideration (and thereby justifying the employment of the great humanitarian framework 
attached to such characterization) generally considered to constitute an internal conflict. 
However, as the argument in the present thesis is that the conflict cannot even be comprised 
within the framework of non-international armed conflicts as it takes form in contemporary 
humanitarian law, the justification for an in-depth analysis on the potential 
internationalization of such is vague.  
By in the following chapter tracing the underlying causes of the conflict back in 
time as well as pinpointing the difficulties that the CAR and the wider region contemporarily 
faces as a result thereof, while simultaneously contrasting the findings with the already 
established conflict-typology noted in this section; it will be possible to crystallize the 
quaintness of the situation current in the CCS-region. It will be illuminated that when 
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correctly contextualizing the individuality of the region; the in IHL inherent dichotomy – and 
even the discourse on unofficial hybrid versions of the same – is insufficient in yet another 
aspect than those already pointed out in legal doctrine.  
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3 Challenging the normative 
framework 
While chapter 2 outlined the theoretical starting point for a conflict-analysis the present 
chapter intends to more intricately discuss the CCS-region from a historical, social and geo-
political perspective. When exemplifying and assessing the case-specific features of the 
situation, it will be clear that ordinary contextualization of conflicts in accordance with the 
typologies outlined in the previous chapter cannot be considered to clearly embrace the 
regionalized conflict in the north-eastern Central African Republic, eastern Chad and western 
Sudan. Correct application of the Geneva Conventions requires a certain context. The context 
being that of a European-inspired territorially delimited area and a Westphalian 
conceptualization of communality. As will be enlightened, the characteristics of the region 
however show other, multifaceted dimensions of communality and regionalism. The CCS-
region presents a psychological and geographical integrity beyond colonially delimited 
borders and as such presents a challenge to the Westernalized humanitarian framework. The 
currently sprawling conflict is regionalized rather than nationalized or internationalized and 
thereby difficult to access from the perspective of international humanitarian law as it takes 
form in the Geneva Conventions. Not only so, attempts to subsume the currently sprawling 
conflict in the Central African Republic under any of the unofficial hybrid versions of 
conflicts is just as difficult, as they all evolves from the same ideas of Westphalian states and 
thereto related humanitarian law. The in-between typologies presented in the previous chapter 
thus also evolves from ideas of clearly delimited states, territorial boundaries and fixed armed 
groups and are equally improper for addressing the conflict. Notwithstanding certain 
similarities with the conflict-typologies noted above, the conflict in the CAR and the wider 
CCS-region possess additional elements which cannot be overlooked, especially the 
involuntary colonial heritage and the violent postcolonial history. 
 
3.1 Perspectives of escalating hostilities 
Formed by diverse rebel groups
88
, the Seleka-militia, headed by Mr. Djotodia, emerged in late 
2012 in the northeast of the CAR. With the intention of overthrowing then-President Bozizé 
the Seleka forcibly and violently gained increasing territorial control over the CAR in 
2012/2013. As of late March 2013 the Seleka had taken control over 15 of the 16 provinces in 
CAR as well as over the capital and had forced then-President Bozizé to resign.
 
This was the 
initiation of the last year’s spiraling hostilities in the CAR.89 Already before the seizure of 
power had the Seleka-force caused significant humanitarian suffering on the raid through the 
country towards Bangui. However, the emergence of what can only be described as major 
human rights atrocities and immense destruction of property and humanitarian resources 
particularly evolved after the seizure of power in March 2013. HRW and AI provides 
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evidence of mass destruction of villages, wounded populations fleeing from their homes into 
the bush as well as malnutrition, lack of access to humanitarian relief and medical services 
and numerous civilian casualties.
90
 
Mr. Djotodia was – after his self-imposed presidency – officially sworn in as 
interim President of the CAR in August 2013 and dissolved the Seleka-militia the following 
month, although firmly denying any allegations of human rights abuses committed by them. 
Notwithstanding the so called ‘symbolic’91 dissolution, considerable fractions of the Seleka 
group continued and still continue to act as if they were in military power of the CAR.
92
 The 
unorganized remains of the Seleka militia continuing to conduct atrocities were soon referred 
to as the ‘ex-Seleka’93.  
In response to the continuation of unofficial military raids against the population 
by the ex-Seleka; a civil counterforce emerged in the autumn of 2013. From the beginning 
loosely referred to as ‘elements loyal to [the previous President] Mr. Bozizé and self-defense 
militias’94 by the international society; the opposing groups gained increasing support and 
were categorized under the heading of ‘anti-Balaka’95 by the Deputy UNSG later the same 
year. Just before Mr. Eliasson acknowledged the anti-Balaka as constituting a sufficiently 
organized human construction as to be placed under a united, separate category of militia 
within the CAR (notwithstanding the lack of a clear structure of command), the UNHCHR 
Navi Pillay emphasized the tensions between ethnic communities and increased religious 
polarization along the lines of Christians and Muslims within the CAR.
96
  
While the ex-Seleka force mainly consists of Muslims, the opposing anti-Balaka 
is predominantly made up of Christians. In retaliation of the abuses committed by the Seleka, 
the anti-Balaka increasingly and indiscriminately attacked inhabitants of Muslim communities 
and villages during late 2013. In the same way, the ex-Seleka attacks evolved from random 
acts of pillage, deliberate killings and looting into attacks specifically directed at the Christian 
population. Adding weight to the conflict between the opposing ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka 
groups and their associates are several aspects, of which two should initially be mentioned. 
The political factor refers to the fragments of the anti-Balaka who were previous soldiers and 
members of the former official military Force Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) under the 
Bozizé regime. Recapturing power and reinstalling Mr. Bozizé as President tends to underlie 
their actions rather than religious hatred, even though the previous FACA members and the 
wider anti-Balaka group are closely interrelated.
97
 The second aspect is partly of economic 
character and in a wider perspective a factor relating to heritage and diverse ways of living. 
Closely related to differences in religion in the CAR are the differences in cultures of 
residency. While considerable parts of the nomadic groups living in the CAR are Muslims, 
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moving their livestock from place to place as practiced in generations, the culture of farming 
and agriculture are usually practiced by Christians. In the search for water and nutrition for 
their cattle the nomads, especially the Mbororo, often comes in conflict with the Gbaya, 
farmers of Christian origin. Confrontations are common between the two and the escalation of 
sectarian violence related to the ex-Seleka and the anti-Balaka, has not gone unnoticed for 
these groups.
98
 
Hence, without having been previously involved in the confrontations or even 
having supported the Seleka, civilians happening to be of Muslim origin have repeatedly been 
the object of attack by the anti-Balaka militia since the autumn of 2013. At the same time, the 
dissolved Seleka force (the ex-Seleka), has without apparent organization, hierarchy or 
structure continued to conduct horrific atrocities either indiscriminately or against Christians 
and the Gbaya population in particular.  
What was initially an uprising by the Seleka-coalition against the previous 
Bozizé presidency has thus turned into a severe sectarian conflict. However, it is of 
significance to note that there are not merely religious factors underlying the violence, even 
though the religious polarization of Muslim and Christians communities was specifically 
emphasized by the UNHCHR as an underlying cause of the conflict.
99
 What is even more 
important than the sectarian feature of the violence is the historical background of the current 
conflict. Ethnicity and divergent traditional ways of living and holding residency are 
undeniable underlying factors for the prolongation of the hostilities. Further, the conflict 
cannot arguably be stated to be confined within the territory of the Central African Republic. 
Recent events are in fact nothing but expressions of and a continuation of a much deeper 
regionalized conflict, the prolongation of which leads back to the time of decolonization in the 
mid 20
th
 century. Hence, for a correct understanding of current hostilities it is necessary the 
make a historic review of the CAR and the surrounding region. 
 
3.2 Colonization and its consequences 
3.2.1 Pre-colonial and colonial era 
The predecessors of the population living in the Central African Republic today, moved to the 
territory in the middle of the 18
th
 century. Then called Oubangui-Chari the area became 
inhabited by ethnic groups without apparent governance, organization or political structure, 
moving in from diverse African territories. As such, the groups were not unusually 
involuntary forced to become slaves of the neighbouring sultanates having developed basic 
societal structures.
100
  
Bangui was established as the capital in 1889 by Frenchmen and the following 
decade was characterized by increasing French influence inaugurating the colonization of 
Oubangui-Chari in 1903, as a part of French Equatorial Africa (FEA). FEA was divided 
amongst about 40 French private companies granted the opportunity to invest in the territory 
as they preferred, of which about 17 companies gained control over and split Oubangui-Chari. 
Notwithstanding the natural resources available in the fertile region, the territory and its 
inhabitants were mainly used and exploited for the rubber industry and later on for the 
construction of railways. With a rainy season of 8-10 months a year, Oubangui-Chari was an 
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unattractive place of residence for the French colonizers. Thus, in the beginning of the 1900s 
and the colonial era merely about 150 foreigners established a permanent or occasional living 
in Bangui (no information provides that foreign establishment took place outside of Bangui), 
with the foreign presence having increased to a few thousands at the end of the colonization. 
Even so and although no exact numbers are available of the amount of Africans living in the 
territory during the time of colonial subordination or before that, it is estimated that half of the 
African population in Oubangui-Chari died as a direct consequence of colonization, either due 
to violent killings, inhuman slave-conditions or by diseases transmitted from the foreigners.
101
  
The division of the territory characterized as French Equatorial Africa has had 
effects of the geo-political climate of the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan until the 
present day.  
 
3.2.2 Porous borders and distant capitals 
Addressing firstly the concrete geography of the CAR it is noteworthy that as a direct 
consequence of the colonial impingement Bangui and the second greatest city Bimbo are both 
located in the south/south-western CAR, about 800 kilometers from the Vakaga province in 
the north-eastern part of the country. This distance is not unimportant for the contemporary 
polarization of and the all-over hostile environment in the country. The geographical distance 
in combination with the weather conditions of the CAR furthers an extraordinary separation 
between the population in the south/south-west and the north-east of the CAR. Transportation 
by land between the two areas is impossible during the rainy season and the route could take 
months to travel even during the dry season due to underdeveloped infrastructure and lack of 
resources to build sustainable roads.
102
 While the infrastructure within the country has 
continuously been substandard, transnational transportation in relation to the neighbouring 
states Chad and Sudan is and always has been frequent and unproblematic. Giroux et al states 
that imagining a painted map over the CCS-region: ‘reveals deceptively clear state boundaries 
that are challenged by the reality of porous borders, which allow goods and people to travel 
between states, contributing to the patchwork nature of this region’.103  
Geographical and socio-economic distance between a province (in the CAR the 
province Vakaga) and the administrative and economical centre focused around the capital is 
not exclusively a problem for the Central African Republic. Chad and Sudan shows similar 
distances and faces similar challenges, important factors in the communality of the CCS-
region. Just as the Vakaga province is located hundreds of kilometers from Bangui and is 
inaccessible during most of the year, is there a geographical sphere of hundreds of difficultly 
travelled kilometers between parts of eastern Chad and the Chadian capital N’Djamena. 
Likewise, the territorial and psychological distance between Darfur and the Sudanese reign 
elite placed in Khartoum is undeniable. Thus, the area of eastern Chad, western Sudan and 
north-eastern CAR are territorially closer to each other than they are connected to their 
respective capitals.
104
 Territorial boundaries drawn by the former colonizers, France and the 
United Kingdom
105
 are  poorly governed, frequently crossed and may be conceived of as 
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theoretical at best, not to say fictional. The situation has accurately been described by the 
International Crises Group:  
 
The extreme north east of the CAR (…) is a world where Sango, the national 
language is hardly spoken and where Muslims are in the majority. It is an 
arid savannah that has always looked more towards Abéché, in Chad, and 
Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, the two spiritual centres and seats of 
power to which local chiefs have traditionally given their alliance (…) The 
CAR shares a 1200 km border with Sudan. There are only two border posts 
(…) which are 700 km apart from each other.106  
 
An additional aspect of importance for understanding the regionalized communality of north-
eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western Sudan is the religious tensions prevailing in the 
countries. Looking at the example of the CAR; along with the enterprises and merchants 
establishing businesses in Oubangui-Chari in the late 19
th
 century followed Christian 
missionaries, founding schools and churches. As the foreign presence, both economical and 
ecclesiastical in the CAR was clearly confined to Bangui; an all the more well-educated 
Christian minority evolved in the capital. Similar events and preferential treatment of certain 
areas and communities took place in Chad.
107
 Economic enhancement within Bangui was a 
result of the strengthened foreign presence and investments in combination with a 
development of the rubber industry. The rubber industry not only increased the centralization 
of economics and administration to Bangui, slaves from outside of the capital were violently 
forced to work as collectors of rubber vine; furthering an increased social separation of the 
population.
108
 A clear polarization could consequently be mapped between the Christian 
administrative, financial and societal structures emerging within Bangui – and the contrasting 
undeveloped, uneducated indigenous population in the rest of Oubangui-Chari already in the 
early colonial era. As a consequence a distinct separation emerged between the Christian 
population and other religious groups already in the early colonial years, from which the roots 
of the enmity between Christians and Muslims witnessed in contemporary CAR can be 
traced.
109
  
In the Vakaga province the great majority of the population is Muslim; a 
simultaneous cause and effect of the proximity to the neighbouring state’s populations also 
belonging to Islam.
110
 Taking into account that 80 percent of CAR’s population today belongs 
to Christianity, the Muslim population in the Vakaga province constitutes a clear religious 
minority within the CAR.
111
 When addressing the issue of religion it is however necessary to 
also bear in mind the divergent ways of living practiced among different ethnic groups. 
Already mentioned in section 3.1 a particular concern in this regard is the clashes occurring 
between the Muslim nomadic group Mbororo and the Christian agricultural group Gbaya. 
Human Rights Watch, states that the antagonism between the two has become increasingly 
palpable in recent years.
112
 Introduction of Christianity within the CAR society is not to be 
pointed out as the sole cause from which the contradictions between the different groups has 
emerged and religion is not today and most certainly has not been the single source of 
contention in the history of the CAR. Nonetheless, the introduction of Christianity was an 
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unequivocal expression and consequence of foreign, colonial impingement. Just as the 
African continent and in particular in this case the CCS-region was to be organized into 
political structures similar to and following the European structure under the colonial ruling, 
was the society simultaneously to be indirectly subsumed under the umbrella of Christianity. 
As mentioned, along with foreign Christian missionaries came financial investments, building 
of schools and churches as well as establishment of permanent societies confined within 
certain territorial areas. Agriculture evolved as an alternative way of living to the previously 
common way of living by herding cattle and practicing traditional nomadism, as had been 
done by the indigenous people and the Muslim communities in the pre-colonial time. In this 
way the financial, educational and agricultural development went hand in hand with 
Christianity. Ethnic groups such as the Gbaya mainly present in the southern parts of the CAR 
turning to the, in the colonial years, new religion thus gained a certain advantage withheld 
from the non-Christian ethnic groups such as the Mbororo, in particular located in the arid 
north-eastern parts of the CAR.  
 
3.3 Decolonization and the emergence of 
Westphalian-inspired states 
3.3.1 The process of decolonization 
Decolonization was to a great extent inevitably interrelated with the notion and emergence of 
the nation-state. As noted by Herbst
113
 structuring and organizing a population within a 
defined territory under the heading of the nation-state has for long been the ordinary mode 
within international law. Even though the notion of nation-state can initially be drawn from 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it was in the mid 20
th
 century as the concept gained major 
significance by the decolonization of States around the world. The difficulties attached to the 
emergence of sovereignty can most easily be noted in the African region.
114
 By attempting to 
comprise the previous social structures of the African region into the western, mainly 
European standardized form of the nation-state difficulties arose. While embracing the right to 
self-determination and sovereignty, the newly developed nation-states positioned in the 
aftermaths of years of colonial ruling cannot but have faced structural and organizational 
problems. Their prerequisites for state-building were profoundly different from the European 
states having developed societal structures long before. 
But before immersing into the structural and administrative problems of nation-
building in the mid 20
th
 century, a recap of the concept of colonialism as such is of 
importance. Looking beyond the imperialistic and racially segregating conceptions of 
colonization in Africa, it should be emphasized that a great amount of interaction between the 
European colonizers and the leaders of the African communities which were to be colonized, 
took the form of formal, official treaties and agreements. In the words of Matthew Craven:  
 
From the early 1880s onwards European exploration of the interior of Africa 
was to be marked, among other things, by the systematic and widespread 
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conclusion of treaties with local kings and chiefs providing for ‘Protection’ 
or for the ‘cession’ of sovereignty.115 
 
Questions soon arose of which the answers still appear uncertain in the legal doctrine, the 
most obvious relating to the determination of statehood, sovereignty and national self-
determination. Leaving the question of the highly doubtful consciousness and free will of the 
leaders of territories about to become colonies as a result of the alleged protective agreements 
for now, the present focus regarding the alleged agreements relates instead to the 
characterization of the parties involved in the conclusion of the treaties. If, as Craven suggests 
the concluded agreement between a European state and a leader of an African community 
furthered the cession of sovereignty, there must necessarily have existed a sovereignty which 
the African community was able to yield. Following this not unreasonable finding, the 
interrelation between the colonizer and the colonized however is difficultly assessed. At the 
same time as the African communities were conceived of as lesser developed and uncivilized 
territories unequal to the civilized European states and without a righteous claim of self-
determination, the African communities were clearly conceived of as entities sovereign 
enough as to conclude treaties on the passing of sovereignty.
116
 In this ambiguous approach to 
the African communities it is difficult to assess the very essence, the actual characterization of 
the communities becoming colonies.
117
 
The characterization of the legal status of the colonies became even more 
questionable in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, as the Covenant on the League of Nations
118
 
initiated the Mandate system. In article 22 the Covenant refers to territories and communities 
no longer under the sovereignty of previous colonizers.
119
 By this reference it appears clear 
that the former colonies after the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations were no 
longer conceived of as subsumed under the sovereignty of the foreign colonizers. On the other 
hand, no explicit reference was made to any other characterization of the territories and 
communities which could be taken as an acknowledgment of the independent sovereignty of 
the former colonies. Instead, the concept of Mandates was used, which in itself had to be 
judicially assessed and clarified. As it was clear by the wording of Article 22 that the 
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sovereignty of the former colonies was not held by the former colonizer, while at the same 
time the Covenant showed no pretention of acknowledging self-determination or sovereignty 
for the communities themselves, the designation of the sovereignty of the previous colonies 
appears unclear at this stage.  
The difficulty of assessing the character of the territories and affording 
sovereignty to one part or the other furthered the necessity of redefining the wider concept. 
Rather than focusing on the problematic features attached to the notion of sovereignty the 
international society began to use the concept of legal personality to describe international 
entities. Personality in this sense meant the capacity and ability to make agreements with 
other international entities, which all international subjects enjoyed on an equal basis.
120
 Thus, 
the former colonies were considered equal with the former colonizers in the sense that they 
had equal legal personalities and capacities to enter into agreements and take on obligations – 
while the Mandate system could at the same time be justified by the very fact that as the 
former colonies had equal legal personality they had the possibility to give up the sovereignty 
of the territory to others. The capacity afforded to them by the recognition of legal personality 
was thereby, among others, the capacity to righteously give up sovereignty.
121
 
Notwithstanding the new way of conceiving of the international entities, the questions of 
statehood and independence of the former colonies remained.  
When, after the Second World War decolonization emerged as an all the more 
concrete idea, the inherent characterization of the former colonies, which had not yet 
sufficiently been answered, was once again brought up on the international agenda.
122
 Noted 
by Craven, what became the predominant way of tackling the situation was for the formerly 
dominant state to ‘creating the necessary legal space for the new State to then assert its rights 
over the territory and population concerned’123.   
 
3.3.2 Socio-political structures 
Now, the importance of the previous section lies not explicitly in the literary discourse of 
statehood and sovereignty as such, but in the deeper implications following and the deplorable 
outcomes of the decolonization process. The main point here is that the African territories and 
populations conceived of as having gained independence and having been afforded the legal 
space for building new states were the territories and populations in the understandings of the 
former colonizers and Mandate holders. However, neither the delineation of territories as 
colonies in the late 19
th
 century and the following classification of Mandates nor the 
subsequent process of decolonization took into account the actual situation of the peoples 
concerned.  
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When the African communities were organized into sociopolitical structures 
following those of European States and the societies and inhabitants were subsumed under the 
features of European-inspired statehood; fundamental characteristics of the original 
communities were denied. Controversies on the allocation of sovereignty, the ambit of 
independence and the assignment of self-determination were in fact merely different 
utterances of applying the Euro-centric understanding of nation-building to the so called new 
states. As mentioned in section 2.1 the concepts emerged from and within the context of 
nation-building in the late medieval Europe (essentially from the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648) – far from the reality of African societies in the 20th century. Applying the in Europe 
then well functioning principles of state-building to the highly different circumstances in 
Africa is largely to be blamed for the failure of organizing functioning entities in the latter.   
Linear territorial boundaries drawn by previous colonizers took no account of the 
factual boundaries in between communities, thus challenging original social delineations. 
Geographical demarcations forcibly separated religious and ethnic groups under 
administrative and hierarchical structures while bringing others involuntary together. 
Nevertheless, in practice, separation of tribes and societies appears to have been mainly 
theoretical, creating for the population artificial lines. Just as several nomadic groups residing 
in central Africa have firmly kept their traditional way of living throughout the colonial era 
until today, have commerce and trade continued in regions functioning beyond colonially 
linear boundaries. In the words of Giroux et al:  
 
The borders of many African states were drawn arbitrarily by the colonial 
powers, dividing areas that had strong historic links and bringing them under 
the rule of separate distant capitals (…) in many large post-colonial states in 
Africa, the hinterlands are historically, economically, politically and 
culturally dissociated from their capitals and oriented towards neighbouring 
areas across the border.
124
  
 
Social, financial and geo-political distance between the population and the governing elite 
usually situated in the capital of the state is here pointed out by Giroux et al as a main factor 
behind weak political governance and ruling of African states. The idea may easily be applied 
to the situation prevailing in the CAR and the wider CCS-region.   
Consequently, when the demarcation of territory was conducted in the process 
of colonization, no consideration was given the regionalism reign in the CCS-region. If 
geographical factors and natural assets as well as demographical, linguistic, religious and 
ethnical bonds had been taken into account in the colonial era and the subsequent process of 
decolonization, the boundaries drawn would have looked utterly different. The delimited 
territories would have been given different forms, potentially furthering less unsatisfactory 
consequences for the newly emerged states. Geographical proximity of the countries’ regions 
(north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western Sudan) and porous, almost invisible borders 
discussed in section 3.2.2 in combination with the ignored socio-political structures outlined 
in this section are all factors of great importance for understanding that characterizing the 
conflict in line with any of the hybrid typologies noted in section 2.4 above is difficult. 
Several of the typologies require clear and distinct territorial boundaries. Clearly, the CCS-
region does not present a situation of such required distinct clarity. Colonially drawn national 
delimitations have had the effect of politically and administratively separating the region’s 
inhabitants under the authority of three different capitals, in theory. In practice on the other 
hand the residents in the CCS-region appears to have continuously regarded the territorial 
sectioning as in the nearest fictional and social and communal activities on a regional basis 
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have been continuously upheld. The borders supposed to be crossed in accordance with 
established conflict typology are basically absent. Subsuming a situation under a typology 
presupposing a transgressing character of the conflict, when there are in practice no borders to 
transgress is thus somewhat meaningless. As a consequence, characterizing the situation and 
ongoing conflict under the heading of for instance ‘spill over’ or ‘cross border’ hostilities is 
inevitably pointless. Such conceptualizations simply become eviscerated when the underlying 
premises are inexistent.  
 
3.4 Post-colonial developments 
3.4.1 Prolonged post-colonial hostilities  
Described above, one heritage from the colonial era in the Central African Republic was a 
clear division between the capital and the hinterlands. As the foreign colonizers had almost 
exclusively settled in Bangui the financial, administrative and societal development in the 
capital were years ahead of the developmental situation in the rest of the country at the time of 
independence. Involvement by Christian missionaries, input of foreign finances, 
establishment of missionary schools and focus on political administration within the capital 
furthered the evolvement of a politically centralized and educated Christian minority in 
Bangui.
125
 Christian influence also had significance for the very independence of the country 
by the fact that the Oubangui-Chari’s first Catholic Priest Barthélemy Boganda was the first 
person to initiate a political party disputing the French colonial domination. Boganda further 
became the country’s first prime minister in 1958, when the Oubangui-Chari was granted 
internal autonomy.
126
 However, ecclesiastical influence tends to have been continuously 
entangled with the multifaceted question of ethnicity; already mentioned in relation to the 
groups Gbaya and Mbororo. CAR’s post-colonial presidents have all used ethnicity in order to 
gain military and political strength with significant socio-political consequences following. It 
should be reiterated that the events and actors assessed here shows tendencies and exemplifies 
issues from the Central African Republic in relation to the CCS-region, without intending to 
comprehensively describe all angles of the ethnic complexity of the region.  
The 13 August 1960 was the day of independence for Oubangui-Chari and it 
was also the day Boganda died under unclear circumstances, leaving the presidential post 
open. Supported by the previous French colonizers, Mr. David Dacko violently took control 
over the parliament and was installed in the presidential seat. Starting his political carrier by 
placing the opponent presidential candidate in house arrest and implementing a series of 
restrictive regulations, Dacko initiated the since then continuously instable era of the country. 
He was the first in a series of political leaders adapting to the same lines of thought and 
actions. By profiting adherents and supporters to the respective presidents, while violently 
fighting and avenging any political opponents, the political climate in the Central African 
Republic became increasingly incused by a mentality of vengeance and ethnic manipulation 
during the last decades of the 20
th
 century.  
Following Dacko, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, having previously been a captain of the 
French army, forcibly took power in 1965. Gathering the official and military powers in his 
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own hands and converting to Islam in order to gain support from Libyan Colonel Quaddafi, 
Bokassa changed the constitution of the CAR and created the Central African Empire (a 
constitution which remained throughout his presidency). Having provoked and strained the 
population, his own followers and the previous French support during more than a decade, 
Bokassa met increasingly violent opposition initially led by his previous prime-minister 
Ange-Félix Patassé and the former president David Dacko. Bokassa was overthrown with the 
help of a French intervention in 1979.  
French-supported Dacko was reinstalled as president, but he was unable to 
handle Bokassa’s heritage of developmental and financial backlog and subsequently gave up 
power to the FACA General Kolingba. The following ruling under Kolingba was marked by 
the former colonizer’s recurrence and presence. The French secret service practically 
controlled the political affairs of the CAR in the 1980s while Kolingba merely ostensibly 
governed the country. Referred to as the ‘inventor of ethnicity’127 he was the first president to 
clearly conduct ethnic manipulation amongst the military and presidential delegation and the 
ethnic tensions within the country became increasingly palpable during his ruling. While the 
previous colonizers extended and regained control over the CAR, Kolingba dedicated himself 
to rearranging the FACA. Belonging to the ethnic group Yakoma, Kolingba was focused on 
installing and recruiting his ethnic family into the political spheres of the state apparatus as 
well as into FACA and the Presidential Guard (the part of FACA having responsibility over 
the President’s personal security) thus concentrating political and military power to his equals.  
After an unsuccessful coup against the Kolingba ruling conducted by Ange-
Felix Patassé (prime-minister of the former President Bokassa) the ethnic concentration of 
power conducted by General Kolingba evolved into ethnic massacre of groups in opposition 
with the Yakoma. Ethnic hatred between Patassé’s ethnic group Sara-Kaba and the Yakoma 
was practically initiated at this point. Pressured by the previous colonizers, Kolingba finally 
had to concede to and accept the holding of a political election. Supervised by France, the first 
politically democratic election in the CAR was held in 1993, resulting in the triumph by 
Ange-Félix Patassé. When Patassé gained presidency the divergence between the ethnic 
groups evolved into a division along not only ethnic lines but also by a wider north/south 
division as Patassé was the first President coming from the northern CAR. Hence, 
notwithstanding the righteous victory by Patassé, no political stability was to be expected. In 
the same way as his predecessor had inaugurated and concentrated the Yakoma within the 
FACA and the Presidential Guard, Patassé linked his ethnic family from the northern CAR to 
the military as soon as the opportunity availed.
128
  
Described by Giroux et al: ‘Patassé launched a broad effort to weaken the 
Yakoma-dominated military and stacked the French-backed Presidential Guard with members 
from the Kaba thus perpetuating the political exploitation of ethnicity’.129 Having been 
replaced by the Sara-Kaba and demoted from the previously advantageous and preferential 
position in the Presidential Guard to lower positions in the FACA military; several members 
of the Yakoma developed feelings of disaffection against the new presidency. As a result, 
repeated mutinies by the FACA and uprisings against President Patassé followed, straining 
the already bad economy of the CAR and undermining any attempts to reach national stability 
and socio-economic development.  
The last decade of the 20
th
 century and the ruling under Patassé was consequently 
marked by political instability, sprawling inflation, increased guerilla warfare, humanitarian 
deterioration, economic decrease, mutinies and formation of new rebel groups. Receiving 
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scarce help from the international community
130
, Patassé increasingly appealed to and 
employed military forces from Libyan Colonel Quaddafi and Congolese rebels.
131
  
Having first been involved in the Patassé-led coup against General Kolingba and 
subsequently engaged in a second coup in 2001 against the former allied Patassé; Franҫois 
Bozizé fled to the neighbouring state Chad twice; where he received military and financial 
support from the Chadian President Idriss Déby in order to organize military opposition. 
Intensely backed by Déby and Chadian soldiers, Bozizé took over power of Bangui on 15 
March 2003. Thus, the military personnel overthrowing President Patassé under the leadership 
of Bozizé were not exclusively, but to a considerable extent supported by and originating 
from Chad.
132
  
While acknowledging the financial and military support, HRW emphasizes that 
the Chadian involvement in the CAR at the time was not a new phenomenon: ‘The 
government of Chadian President Idriss Déby has played a role in CAR since the early 1990s. 
The Bozizé government was installed with Chadian support in 2003. The Déby government is 
believed to have been a sponsor and perpetrator of human rights abuses against civilians in 
CAR’s north’.133 However, as will be shown, the Chadian involvement in the CAR is not, and 
has never been, confined to merely one part or the other.  
This historic review of the Central African Republic, drawn with an extremely 
broad pencil, precedes the more recent history noted above in section 3.1.1. It shows that the 
post-colonial history has effectively underpinned a normalization of a violent societal climate. 
 
3.4.2 Dynamic armed forces 
Exemplifying the inevitable interrelation between dynamic armed groups, political association 
and the regionalized communality of the CCS-region; Bozizé’s use of Chadian soldiers will 
be addressed later on in this section.
134
 Before that, general tendencies of the armed force will 
be pointed out. In analyzing the militias and rebel movements acting in the region one is faced 
with a highly diffuse and fragmented picture. Military groups and insurrectional movements 
consist of diverse regular and irregular combatants, previous and current soldiers of the 
official military, ethnically related or unrelated families and communities, stigmatized former 
soldiers as well as involuntary enlisted child soldiers or the economically manipulated 
equivalent. While there exist uniform armed groups and militias in Chad and Sudan 
characteristics of the rebel movements in the CAR are more widely disputed.
135
 Some argue 
that there exist organized armed groups in the CAR as well
136
 while others would go so far as 
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to consider that ‘there are no “proper” guerilla groups in the Central African Republic’137. 
Adapting an unbiased view to the ungraspable character of the armed forces in the region, 
Debos argues that: ‘Combatants’ loyalties are extremely fluid (…) The reconversion of armed 
combatants, who may easily shift allegiance, is a structural pattern of the current conflict, 
which has major implications at both the local and transnational levels’.138 She describes and 
emphasizes a significant factor of the regionalized conflict in the CCS-region, the fluidity of 
combatants and their allegiance to shifting political and military leaders.
139
  
Even though attributing the main focus to the practical involvement of Chadian 
soldiers in the Central African Republic, Debos also enlightens general tendencies in and 
perspectives of the militias active in the CCS-region: ‘Chadian combatants and civilians have 
always been numerous in Sudan. Since the 1970s, migrations and armed groups’ movements 
have contributed to the exacerbation and militarization of local tensions and conflicts (…) A 
significant number of Chadian Arabs were recruited into the Sudanese pro-government 
Janjawiid militias, Darfurian insurgent groups are supported by N’Djamena, and Chadian 
rebels are sponsored by Khartoum’.140 The closely interlinked, parallel and simultaneous 
support to and from Chad’s and Sudan’s respective governments and rebel groups have also 
been examined by the CIPO
141
, according to which military and financial support has been 
intertwined to the extent that the conflicts in Sudan and Chad must be considered mixed. With 
regards to Sudan-based militias, the CIPO noted in 2008: 
  
Darfur guerillas are either self-financed (in the case of JEM) or received 
moderate amounts from regional sponsors (Chad) (…) all of them have 
received money or equipment at one time or another and all of them have 
also quarrelled with their erstwhile sponsors (…) The ones most likely to 
prosper are those which can bid for Idriss Déby’s support and serve as 
counter-guerillas to attack the Khartoum-supported Chadian guerillas now 
trying to over-throw the regime in N’Djamena.142 
 
The rebel group RFC exemplifies similar regional involvement in relation to Chadian-based 
militias: 
 
The RFC enjoys a measure of support from Khartoum which is trying to (…) 
overthrow Déby who supports the anti-Khartoum Darfur guerillas (…) The 
two conflicts – Darfur and Chad – have now in fact merged (…) All the 
Chadian rebel groups are 100% financed by Khartoum.
143
 
 
This is problematic in relation to international humanitarian law. When governmental and 
non-governmental groups are internationally merged and occasionally supported by 
neighbouring states, the characterization of the parties involved in hostilities is highly 
difficult. A characterization of the actors is not only of significance when academically 
approaching the conflict in order to subsuming it under the framework of either international 
or non-international conflicts. A characterization of the persons and groups involved in 
hostilities is inevitable for the attribution of accountability for potential misconduct and 
illegitimate violence. The problem will be addressed in section 3.6. 
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Regarding the Chadian presence in the Central African Republic, several 
different versions of involvement can be found. A significant number of Chadians have been 
involved in road banditry, being part of the criminal network of ‘zaraguinas’ also referred to 
as ‘coupeur de routes’.144 The present article does not explicitly deal with the zaraguinas as 
their actions should mainly be addressed within the field of criminal law. Nevertheless, their 
very existence has an inevitable impact on the situation in the CCS-region and in particular in 
the border region of northern CAR and southern Chad. The road-banditry conducted by the 
zaraguinas not only extends every-day violence for the civil population in the already insecure 
area, it also furthers increased flows of arms and weaponry into the territory.
145
 Further, a 
number of zaraguinas have been recruited by the in CAR northern-based rebel group 
APRD.
146
 Additionally, as a direct effect and response to the criminality sprawling in areas 
where the zaraguinas are active – mainly in the border region of Chad and the CAR – so 
called ‘self-defense groups’147 have emerged with the aim of hindering the road-bandits. 
Davis describes the mentality underlying such group formations: 
 
Citizens suffering from extreme levels of violence and insecurity find it 
difficult to know whether public police, private police, the military, local 
vigilante groups, community members, or even criminal mafias will be most 
likely to offer protection from harm. In the absence of any certainty about 
which armed actors or state/non-state institutions are most likely to 
guarantee security or inflict harm, and in the face of growing violence, a 
multiplicity of armed actors offer their own services.
148
 
 
Providing for concrete alternatives to accepting the violent climate; taking up arms, gathering 
in groups and joining already existent armed forces may in many cases seem as attractive 
alternative for the civilians. Notwithstanding the limited resources and in the nearest 
inexistent organization of such self-defense groups, the groups have importance for the socio-
political climate in the northern CAR. At times they join the notorious rebel group APRD, 
which is noteworthy since former zaraguinas – the road bandits whom the self-defense groups 
allegedly are fighting – also occasionally joins the APRD, as just noted.  The various self-
defense groups – as well as their alleged enemies – thus sometimes form part of one of the 
main non-governmental armed forces in the CAR and sometimes do not adhere to the same.
149
 
Such merged allegiances and on-and-off commitment is consequently just as typical for the 
self-defense groups as it is for the zaraguinas and the very subdivisions of the APRD itself, 
like any other rebel group. Varying and shifting adherence and commitment to certain leaders 
and authoritative personalities is a pervasive feature of the unregulated combatants of the 
CAR and the CCS-region.  
Besides the evolving road-banditry; Chadian soldiers have taken part in 
international PKOs in the Central African Republic and unregulated combatants have to a 
varying degree been involved in or joined the UFDR, APRD and other non-governmental 
militias. Most recently it has been noted that: ‘The Seleka coalition (…) is strongly suspected 
to include Chadians who have aligned themselves with local rebels’.150 Regular armed forces 
of the Chadian army have further conducted raids against Chadian militias as well as the 
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Central African equivalent from and within the CAR territory.
151
 Notwithstanding these 
examples of the not-solely internally confined character of Chadian warriors and the obvious 
regional complexity of the militias in the border-region, the clearest example of the 
transnational character of the soldiers is Bozizé’s use of Chadian soldiers in his insurgency 
against Patassé, under the approbation of Idriss Déby.  
Described in section 3.4.1 Franҫois Bozizé took refuge in Chad twice after the 
unsuccessful coups against then-President Patassé and before that the former leader of the 
CAR; General Kolingba. Bozizé gained military and financial support from Déby in order to 
develop the insurrection: ‘Bozizé recruited ex-combatants who had experience from previous 
Chadian wars as well as impoverished youth who had expectations of upward social mobility 
(…) high bonuses were promised to combatants who joined Bozizé’s rebellion (…) as well as 
full integration into the regular forces after the victory’.152  
When, after the overtaking of Bangui on 15 March 2003, financial reward did not 
occur and social progress stagnated, the Chadian soldiers became dissatisfied and turned 
against Bozizé to an increasingly concrete extent. While some of Bozizé’s associated soldiers 
from the CAR received help for reintegration in the society after the coup against Patassé 
through DDR-programs, no such support where provided to the foreign recruited soldiers, 
who instead were left to foster for themselves. Joining other Chadian and Central African 
rebel groups and insurgents thus became an attractive alternative for many former soldiers. 
The combatants were and are still not unusually unemployed and inexperienced youth, 
stigmatized by their families and relatives because of their heinous crimes in the hostilities. 
Further, in the words of Debos:  
 
Combatants who have had long careers as rebels and/or soldiers have the 
resources – combatants’ knowledge and know-how – and social capital – 
kin-based and war-based social networks – to once again commence war-
like activities (…) ex-combatants constitute a threat to stability not only in 
their region or their country of origin but also in the neighbouring 
countries.
153
  
 
Combining the difficulties attached to reintegration into a society under the presupposition of 
social stigmatization, with the rebel groups’ enticements of alleged military strength, social 
networks and potential employments; it is unsurprising that the former Bozizé-supporters 
soon turned into his enemies. Thus, subsumed into the ranks of UFDR, APRD and other 
insurgents or joining the looting zaraguinas in desperate needs for some kind of livelihood 
and socio-communal belonging, the previous soldiers became dangerous forces in the CCS-
region in the beginning of the 21
st
 century.
154
  
But rather than pinpointing and accusing unemployed miss fortuned Chadian 
youths of having developed into ‘regional warriors’155, even though acknowledging the 
underlying reasons of such a characterization, the appropriate view should be that the Chadian 
soldiers essentially exemplifies the character of the armed movements present in the CCS-
region. Armed forces are to a great extent ungraspable, dynamic and constantly shifting. 
Having ‘highly fluid loyalties’156 these unregulated combatants are affected by short-sighted 
political persuasion, economic encouragement, social stigmatization, practical enticements, 
powerful and authoritative leaders, involuntarily disrupted relations with families and 
                                                 
151
 FOMUC. Debos [n 131] p. 227. See section 1.2. 
152
 Debos [n 131] pp. 228 – 229.  
153
 Debos [n 131] p. 235. 
154
 Debos [n 131] pp. 229 – 231, 235.  
155
 Debos [n 131] p. 226.  
156
 Debos [n 131] p. 230.  
41 
 
relatives, manipulative ideas of military glory and not least a context of societal normalization 
of violence.  
Summarily, the present conflict involves diverse and unspecified rebel-groups 
having shifting character, changing authorities, combatants with fluid loyalties and 
allegiances and unclear organizational structures. The militias are occasionally financed by 
internal governmental elements as well as supported by neighbouring countries and are spread 
over indefinite and indeterminate, transnational areas.  
Coming back to the idea of attempting to subsume the conflict under any in 
international humanitarian discourse recognized conflict-typology the potential 
internationalization of an otherwise internal conflict acknowledged in section 2.4 is here of 
relevance. Difficulties of generally characterizing the armed forces engaged in hostilities in 
the CAR and CCS-region in terms of IHL will be further elucidated in section 3.5.2. As it has 
already been pointed out that paramilitary forces in Chad and Sudan have been supported and 
underpinned by the opposing states’ government to significant extents the following section 
will be confined to exemplifying Déby’s involvement in Bozizé’s rebellion.  
The principle established in the Tadić-case on the necessity of the intervening 
state to have ‘overall control’157 becomes relevant in examining whether the support provided 
by Déby could have internationalized the situation in the CAR at the time – and thereby 
would have justified the employment of the great humanitarian framework attached to 
conflicts of an international character. It is acknowledged that support in the form of military 
personnel was provided, in addition to some financial support. As such, it appears as the 
support provided by Chad through President Déby to Bozizé and his rebellion was 
(occasionally intense) ‘financial assistance or military equipment or training’ but did not 
include ‘organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the group’.158 There is 
however extremely scarce information on the factual support provided by Déby to Bozizé, 
which in combination with the vagueness of the overall control criterion makes the 
assessment on whether support by Déby could have internationalized the situation very 
challenging. In any case, even if the support provided by Chad to the non-governmental 
armed force headed by Bozizé extended beyond mere financial and military support and 
thereby would have internationalized the conflict, the period during which the conflict could 
be regarded as internationalized was confined to the initial period of Bozizé’s presidency. 
Even though foreign experts are in agreement that governmental parties and non-
governmental militias are continuously intertwined and mixed to significant extents
159
 no 
explicit information is found on any concrete organizational or coordinating support provided 
by neighbouring states to the different armed forces in contemporary CAR – which would 
have the same internationalizing effect in terms of humanitarian law. 
Noteworthy; Chadian engagement in 2003 is not intended to be used as an all-
embracing explanation of the extent of support needed to internationalize a conflict. Rather, 
the support provided by Déby to Bozizé is one example of the underlying, intertwined 
tendencies of the relations between different governmental and non-governmental parties in 
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the region. It is essentially supporting the argument that not only the territorial requirement 
for application of humanitarian norms, discussed in sections 2.4 and 3.3.2, but also the 
personal requirement of the existence of distinguishable parties to the conflict, is difficultly 
applied in relation to the CCS-region.  
 
3.5 A presupposed Westphalian context 
Described as ‘dividing it among themselves on the drawing-board at the Conference of 
Berlin’160 European colonizers split the African continent into European-inspired entities in 
the end of the 19
th
 century. As the theoretical demarcations of the national entities were 
profoundly different from the reality on the ground, the colonies became instable subjects 
with internal problems already during the colonial era, enlightened in section 3.2. 
Independence movements and struggles for self-determination during decolonization were 
followed by decades of attempts to organize nationally coherent entities, exemplified not least 
by the continuous political struggles in the CAR. Internal conflicts, border-clashes and spill-
over confrontations occurring today are prolonged continuations of these unsolved difficulties 
emerging during and after decolonization. Now, having pinpointed these important features of 
the CCS-region, it is possible to assess the situation and conflict occurring there from the 
perspective of international humanitarian law.  
As was pointed out already in section 2.1, ideas forming the basis for 
contemporary judicial regulations on international warfare emerged in a European/Western 
setting. General international law was initially a result of Western States’ understandings of 
how independent states and societies were supposed to act and interact on an international 
arena. In this, ideas underpinning international law – the concepts of nation-states, 
cartographical delineations and distinct populations etcetera – relied heavily on a Westphalian 
conceptualization of what statehood implied.
161
 In the words of Hassan: ‘in the strict sense the 
modern International law and sovereign territorial States occurred at the same time. The 
history of modern International law begins with the emergence of independent nation-States 
(…) commonly dated from the peace of Westphalia (1648)’.162 As a Westphalian 
understanding of nationality and statehood implying territorial boundaries, clearly 
distinguishable populations and centralized governance formed the natural starting point for 
any international arrangements – it formed the foundation from which also the laws of armed 
conflict evolved. As an inevitable consequence; correct application of humanitarian norms 
requires certain presuppositions; territorially delimited states and distinguishable 
populations and armed forces. When nowadays trying to solve the conflicts and numerous 
challenges of the CCS-region, the humanitarian norms available are still largely those adopted 
in the Westphalian spirit in the aftermath of the colonial era, in particular the Geneva 
Conventions. The particular context required for appropriate application of international 
humanitarian law is thus still the context and presuppositions attached to the Westphalian 
nation state. But both the territorial requirement and the requirement of distinct armed forces 
are unfulfilled in the CCS-region.  
With regards to the territorial requirement: an effect of colonization was the, in 
theory, geographical delimitations of the countries, compatible with the territorial 
presupposition inherent in IHL. In practice however geographical delimitations are absent, 
making the application of IHL and therein underlying territorial presupposition difficult in 
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relation to the region. Applying IHL requiring demarcated territories, to a region without clear 
demarcations is perhaps not meaningless, but clearly challenging. As both the ordinary 
dichotomy of internal and international armed conflicts, and the hybrid versions of internal 
conflicts steam from the same state-centric idea, the CCS-region is vaguely accessible from 
the perspective of European/Westphalian humanitarian law as it takes form today. Likewise is 
the personal requirement inherent in IHL in essence an effect of the Westphalian 
conceptualization of clearly distinguishable populations and armed forces belonging to clearly 
delimited territories. The CCS-region is most appropriately to be seen as a region in and of 
itself, with a distinguished population embracing people from all three countries – rather than 
three distinguished populations. The latter is however how the populations are generally 
conceived of as a consequence of the colonial separation of the regions’ population. Such an 
understanding of the populations is compatible with the European/Westphalian idea of 
statehood and is thus also compatible with humanitarian norms attached thereto. On the 
contrary, humanitarian norms are not clearly compatible with a regionalized approach to the 
population residing in the CCS-region. Both the territorial and the personal requirement will 
be elucidated further in the following subsections.  
The context in which the current conflict takes place is summarily only weakly 
compatible with the required Westphalian context. Just as the Euro-colonial version of 
statehood and territoriality fits badly to the current, regionalized context of Central Africa 
does the legal regulations of the prior fit badly for the latter. Contemporary situations to 
which the antiquated judicial framework is supposed to be applied are profoundly different 
from those situations to which they were applied more than half a century ago. Arguably, 
applying the straightforward and clear-cut Eurocentric/Westphalian version of international 
law to the dynamic setting prevalent in the CCS-region is like laying a pattern of squared lines 
over a picture of somewhat rounds circles with constantly changing lines. The difficulty of 
applying a solid, colonially squared geographical pattern to the socio-politically dynamic 
region – is the same problem as applying inelastic IHL-norms to the dynamic conflict. The 
framework of IHL is in contemporary warfare to be seen as the squared pattern intended to be 
applied to non-squared dynamic hostilities. It does not fit.  
Incompatibility with the notion of international armed conflict as the parties to 
the regionalized conflict in the CCS-region are not explicitly states, in combination with the 
difficulty of applying regulations on non-international armed conflicts due to the undeniable 
involvement of groups and entities of diverse nationalities; makes the characterization and 
application of humanitarian norms highly delicate in the present case. If one were to subsume 
the conflict under any of the typologies outlined in section 2.4, the categories of spill over 
conflicts or cross border conflicts undoubtedly presents the most appropriate alternatives. 
However, neither of the two, nor any of the other typologies correctly addresses the situation. 
Contemporary IHL, the therein inherent dichotomy discussed in chapter 2 and the hybrid 
versions of conflicts not of an explicitly national or international character all emerges from 
the same conceptual source and line of thoughts. The understanding of IHL requiring an 
underlying, presupposed context of state-centered communities in accordance with the spirit 
of the Treaty of Westphalia is ever-present in today’s approaches to contemporary conflicts. 
This presupposed context poses not only practical problems in relation to present-day 
conflict-solving, but also furthers severe ethical dilemmas.  
Rather than reconsidering the geo-political communality of the CCS-region, the 
distinct boundaries and forcibly comprised societies set by Westphalian-inspired colonizers 
have been continuously upheld throughout the violent post-colonial era – exemplified by the 
events having occurred in the CAR – until the present day, with deplorable human and 
societal consequences. How is the upholding of such regrettable, cartographically linear 
demarcation of communities any different from continuously trying to comprise the 
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multifaceted dimensions of the present conflict within the narrow frames of the rules of war, 
concluded under essentially the same premises? Isn’t assessing the conflict with the glasses of 
a predated legal framework simply a continuum of an antiquated perception of societies 
descending from the colonial era?  
 
3.5.1 Requirement of a defined territory 
Besides ethical questions, the practical problems of approaching the conflict with the 
available legal framework have been pointed out above and may be summarized as follows. 
The two elements of the basic IHL-dichotomy – international armed conflicts and conflicts 
not of an international character – both require distinct geographical spheres, which is in 
practice a consequence of the mentioned state-centric Westphalianism. It is clear that the 
conflict is not of an international character, as the parties to the conflict are not explicit states. 
However, the conflict under consideration is internationally merged and sprawls over 
widespread, dynamic and constantly changing areas – not confined within for IHL appropriate 
borders. It is therefore neither a non-international armed conflict. Elucidating the conflict 
sprawling in the Central African Republic without taking into account the situations in the 
neighbouring countries is ignorant. Geographical proximity, psycho-social communality and 
interrelated, simultaneous colonial heritage have formed a deeply intertwined region. Porous 
and dynamic territorial boundaries enable transnational flows of armed groups and weaponry. 
Ungoverned and in the nearest fictional national borders further provides significant 
possibilities of military and political refugee and opportunities to gather human and technical 
support for violent opposition. The essential problem is however not the transnational flows 
of militias and equipment as such. Rather, the problem is that IHL presupposes the existence 
of national borders possible to transgress.  
The colonially marked contextualization of nationally separated territories – in 
line with the wishes of European imperialists – has created entities, coherent in theory but 
fragmented in practice. Violent opposition, cross-border flows of armed groups and military 
equipment and need for transnational refugee might not have been necessary if the national 
borders had taken different shapes. Naturally, it cannot be stated with certainty that no 
violence or conflict would have occurred if the territorial delineations had been drawn 
differently or if the CCS-region had formed an independent, sovereign entity of itself. 
Significant difficulties regarding livelihood and governance would most likely have existed in 
any case. But what is obvious is that the region as it takes form today challenges the 
colonially fixed territorial boundaries of the CAR, Chad and Sudan and the thereto closely 
connected regulatory framework. This is in itself a consequence of that the regionalized 
society has remained – despite the theoretical political and administrative separation of the 
territory into foreign colonizers perceptions of how the nations should be shaped.  
Not only is the regionalized conflict hard to address from the traditional 
international/internal-dichotomy presupposing certain territorial facts. As noted, the hybrid 
versions of conflicts not of an international character all emerge from the same conceptual 
roots and state-centric idea. Notions of spill over wars and cross border clashes have limited 
substance in a territory without clear boundaries and with porous, in the nearest fictional 
borders. Arguably, characterizing the conflict under any of those headings merely maintains a 
state-centered conceptual polarization. Even if the intention with hybrid typologies is to widen 
the scope of application of the humanitarian framework by enlightening the need to recognize 
new forms of conflicts, the typologies upholds and crystallizes the idea of conflicts evolving 
from national disputes having occasional consequences on neighbouring states, while the 
more accurate description would focus on the regionalized dynamics having national effects. 
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Thus, the hybrid typologies are neither directly applicable to the context found in the CCS-
region.  
 
3.5.2 Requirement of distinguishable actors 
The same problem goes for the human element of the normative framework. Noted 
throughout the examination, the non-governmental armed forces engaged in the conflict in the 
CCS-region are anything but structured or organized. Valuable information on the diverse 
armed forces in the CAR has been presented by Prunier, Spittaels and Hilgert, who even 
though pinpointing UFDR, APRD and FDPC as the main actors within the CAR emphasizes 
that the armed forces are multiple, diverse and employing various means and methods in the 
hostilities.
163
 While extremely scarce information is available on the existence and 
whereabouts of the FDPC, some notes may be provided on the prior two.  
Concerning APRD, created in 2005, the structure of the force and its actual 
impact is highly uncertain. While Spittaels and Hilgert argue that the group controls certain 
territory in the northern CAR, being the place of origin of Patassé but without specific 
connections to Patassé himself
164, Prunier describes the group as unorganized, constituting ‘a 
bunch of former Patassé army officers’165. No specific political objectives have been 
presented, their military organization has been described as ‘improvised’ and the structure of 
command as ‘complex’, the number of combatants are unstated and availability of weaponry 
and military material is sporadic.
166
 Noteworthy is that APRD significantly opposed the 
former Bozizé-presidency and has been sponsored by Sudan ‘for the simple reason that 
President Bozizé was put in power with Déby’s help’.167  
The previous President and former leader of the Seleka coalition Mr. Djotodia 
was one of the head leaders of the UFDR when the force emerged in 2006 as a coalition of a 
number of smaller rebel groups. Based mainly in the Vakaga province in the north-eastern 
CAR the group has been said to struggle with internal disputes related to ethnicity and 
leadership. Nonetheless, the group has significance in the CAR; it has previously operated in 
coordination with the then-official military FACA and comprises previous combatants of the 
same as well as park rangers having been trained by the French military. Additionally, they 
have been occasionally supported and supplied by the government of the CAR, and fractions 
of the UFDR subsequently became part of the Seleka-fusion.
168
  
For non-governmental parties to a conflict (not of an explicitly international 
character) such as the UFDR, the APRD, and the Seleka-militia to constitute such armed 
forces as are accessible by the regulations on non-international conflicts in IHL, certain 
requirements, stated in the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, should in principle be 
fulfilled. Even though not obligatory, the premises exemplify conditions from which one may 
initiate an inquiry on the whereabouts of an armed force in the meaning of IHL.
169
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Firstly, insufficiently organized and structured
170
 with dynamic formations and 
highly fluid loyalties depending of the for any particular moment most suitable group 
accession (‘their decision to join a rebellion or not depends on political calculations based on 
their perception of the situation and on their own ambition to achieve a better position within 
the security forces’171) the non-governmental parties and individuals engaged in hostilities can 
hardly be considered to make up the uniform military formations to which IHL is intended to 
apply. The character of the unregulated combatants involved in hostilities has been 
exemplified by the Chadian soldiers of transnational origin described in section 3.2.4.  
Secondly, even if it is not unimaginable that some rebel group may in fact be able 
to present an authority responsible for acts committed by the subordinates, the opposite with 
non-existence of responsible authority of command
172
 presents a much higher percentage of 
likelihood. Command structures of both UFDR and APRD are highly uncertain and evidence 
of the lack of organization of the ex-Seleka continuously conducting raids in the CAR has 
been given by for instance ICG: ‘Since the coalition was formed, it has always been an 
amorphous grouping of combatants from different movements, without a centralized chain of 
command or ideology’.173 
Thirdly, that insurrectional armed forces engage in coups and actions over 
indeterminate and variegated territorial areas
174
 have been enlightened by for instance 
Debos
175
, Spittaels and Hilgert
176
, and has been visualized by the IPIS
177
.  
Fourthly, concluding whether or not the armed forces have the possibilities of 
ensuring respect for the humanitarian judicial framework
178
 would require psychological, 
sociological and structural analyzes on each group individually, which the present article does 
not have the means for. Nonetheless, it does not appear very controversial to argue that the 
majority of the armed forces do not possess such a capacity, based on cumulative facts. 
Primary education is deplorable in the CAR and the CCS-region meaning that it is highly 
unlikely that individuals are generally taught the laws of armed conflict in the basic school 
system.
179
 Armed rebel movements do not usually have as a common aim to conduct fair and 
righteous acts with legal means, but rather to achieve its goals by any means or methods – 
proved not least by the horrific acts and war crimes committed by the Seleka militia and the 
anti-Balaka group mentioned in sections 2.2 and 3.1. Additionally, even if the Geneva 
Conventions were somehow known by persons allegedly in responsible command of the 
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guerillas, which in itself is unlikely, the chance of that knowledge consciously penetrating 
down the fragmented ranks of the militias to the combatants on the ground so that the latter 
achieves the means of respecting the Conventions is merely wishful thinking. Paulus and 
Vashakmadze notes: ‘it seems problematic to assess the ability of armed groups to implement 
international humanitarian law and whether this should be seen as a criterion for identifying 
these groups as parties to conflict at all’.180  
Fifthly, an additional indication of the existence of rebel groups in the eyes of the 
Geneva Conventions mentioned by the commentary is that the Government of the State – for 
the example enlightened in the present article; the Government of the Central African 
Republic – is forced to use the strength of the official military in order to combat the rebels.181 
Previously constituting such an official military, the FACA appears however to continuously 
have been in the nearest as non-uniform and diverse as the rebel groups themselves. Noted in 
sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the FACA as well as the Presidential Guard was repeatedly used for 
ethnic segregation and manipulation. Not only so, evidence has been given that the FACA’s 
means and methods of warfare through history have rarely been different from that used by 
the rebel groups. Until 2007 the FACA was ‘responsible for the vast majority of the most 
serious human rights abuses in the conflict’.182 For instance, in a counteroffensive against 
northern-based rebellion in the CAR under the ruling of Bozizé in 2005 the FACA and the 
Presidential Guard carried out severe human rights abuses against the civilian population. 
Both groups: ‘showed little inclination to directly confront the rebels, opting instead for an 
extremely brutal campaign against the civilian population suspected of supporting them. A 
scorched-earth policy was carried out, with governmental troops destroying hundreds of 
villages in the space of a few months, slaying large numbers of innocent civilians and putting 
almost 300,000 to flight’.183 Regarding the existence of any contemporary official military, 
the re-building and re-construction of such are said to be in an ‘embryonic stage’.184 Lacking 
financial and political resources, the rebuilding of FACA has since the overtaking by Mr. 
Djotodia been consistently countered by the Seleka-militia.  
The fragmented, two-edged and instable appearance of the FACA is only one 
example of the diffuse character of the regular armed forces in the CCS-region. In relation to 
the military and official regime of neighbouring Chad, Debos presents a similar 
exemplification:  
 
The army, police, gendarmerie, customs, and other paramilitary groups 
primarily comprise ex-combatants (…) regular forces have thus become a 
good place to wait for the next war. Under such circumstances, the boundary 
between the status of military and combatant is blurred, reflecting simply 
different phases in the lives of men in arms (…) experience in soldiering is 
usefully recycled to work in the army, the rebellion or road banditry.
185
 
 
Consequently, the armed forces engaged in the hostilities in the CAR and the wider CCS-
region is somewhat ungraspable with the means of contemporary humanitarian norms. They 
do not fulfill the criteria set by the Geneva Conventions concerning organization or structure. 
They are dynamic and constantly varying. They involve governmental as well as non-
governmental actors. They change format frequently. Their supporters may just as well be 
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their enemies. As such, the personal requirement presupposed for correct application of 
Westphalian-inspired IHL is anything but fulfilled. The militias and rebel groups active in the 
region thus are difficultly accessed from the perspective of humanitarian law; despite their 
undeniable existence and despite the fact that they’ve been recognized to constitute ‘a threat 
to international peace and security’.186  
 
3.6 Summary and consequences 
Ordinary conflict-assessments evolve from the idea that hostilities may be subsumed under 
either the umbrella of international armed conflicts or non-international armed conflicts. 
Depending on perceptible facts on the ground and based on objective criteria any belligerency 
will be addressed as one or the other and the associated humanitarian framework will be 
applied. If the adversaries in violent confrontation are international entities defined as states 
the conflict will be classified as an international armed conflict. Should the opposing parties 
not fulfill the criterion of being international entities defined as states will the conflict instead 
be characterized as non-international. Both characterizations require that that the clashes 
between the parties are violent enough as to constitute armed conflicts. If for some reason the 
elemental criteria for the two polarized categories are insufficiently fulfilled, the belligerency 
may unofficially be recognized to constitute a conflict in between, a hybrid version of armed 
conflict. Several hybrid versions of in particular non-international armed conflicts – which are 
the conflicts posing most challenges to the humanitarian framework today – have been 
presented in legal doctrine. Challenges addressed by these hybrid versions concerns hostilities 
when the parties involved are not inexplicitly governmental or non-governmental, or 
situations when conflicts which are essentially national are spread over into other states’ 
territories or have international effects. This was outlined in chapter 2.  
Determining the character of a particular conflict and categorizing it under the 
norms of IHL requires an analysis of the actors involved in the conflict and the geographical 
scope of the same. In the present chapter it has been concluded that the problem of such an 
analysis in relation to the present case is that the analysis presupposes a certain context. IHL 
and any analysis attached thereto presuppose a context according to which it is possible to 
distinguish distinct armed forces and confined territories. The dichotomy of IACs/NIACs 
clearly requires a sectioning of nations and a partition between governmental and non-
governmental actors. Hybrid typologies likewise essentially presume that the actors involved 
in hostilities are distinguishable with identifiable characteristics and that nationally delimited 
territories are recognizable.  
Ideas of recognizable armed forces and controlled national borders basically 
evolve from ideas of nationally coherent and demarcated entities in the form of states having 
been afforded territorial sovereignty and possessing distinguishable populations with 
righteous leaders. As such; the ideas are based on a conceptualization of societies drawn from 
the Treaty of Westphalia. Appropriate application of contemporary humanitarian norms 
therefore essentially requires a Westphalian setting; personally and geographically. In other 
words, IHL presupposes a certain context for its applicability: a Westphalian context implying 
centralized governance, demarcated territories and distinct populations. Existence of a 
presupposed Westphalian context for IHL’s applicability is not in itself a problem. General 
international law and the majority of contemporary multinational treaties rely heavily on the 
same foundation. What is problematic is that the presuppositions required for correct 
application of humanitarian norms are absent in the CCS-region.  
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When attempting to apply humanitarian norms as they take form today to the conflict 
currently sprawling in the Central African Republic and its surroundings one is faced with an 
intricate, undeniable problem. Worth repeating; humanitarian norms presuppose and require a 
Westphalian context for its appropriate applicability and it should be acknowledged that 
territorial borders and national delimitations set in accordance with colonially, arbitrarily 
drawn demarcations are in fact compatible with such Westphalian requirements.  
Theoretically can the conflict in the CAR be seen as an internal conflict while 
the conflicts in Sudan can simultaneously be conceptualized as nationally confined and the 
continuously ongoing hostilities taking place in eastern Chad be conceived of as purely intra-
state rebellion. Following such theoretical characterization, humanitarian norms are easily 
applied. Presuming that the non-governmental militias in each country possess certain 
organization, that their actions reaches a certain level of intensity and that they are constrained 
to the respective countries’ territory; the judicial framework attached to conflicts not of an 
international character is applicable. Further, if clashes between governmental and non-
governmental forces have occasional effects on territories beyond the national borders, the 
conflict may unofficially be classified as a hybrid version of NIAC of some kind, to which the 
same judicial framework applies. Even the latter cases are compatible with the required 
presupposed Westphalian context, as also the hybrid typologies steam from the same 
conceptual source of clearly delimited states and coherent armed forces. Notions of spill-over 
conflicts and cross-border clashes are as mentioned merely concepts manifesting and 
crystallizing ideas of belligerency ordinarily confined within national borders – conducted by 
coherent armed forces – having occasional effects abroad. 
In practice conversely the situation is much more complicated and not that 
easily described. Arguably, the area comprising north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western 
Sudan constitute a highly intertwined region presenting multifaceted dimensions of 
communality. The hinterlands of the north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western Sudan are 
closer related, geographically, ethnically and demographically, to each other than to their 
respective capitals in terms of climate, history, culture, language, religion and administration. 
Interrelations between families and communities as well as trade, herding and livelihood are 
trans-boundary and spread over territories embracing parts of each and all of the states. The 
importance of this not-nationally confined character of the communities and persons residing 
in the CCS-region cannot be overestimated. National borders are porous, ungoverned and 
transparent, almost fictional delimitations. As such, the possibilities for nomadic herding 
groups to move across states’ borders in search for water and nutrition for their cattle have 
been maintained in practice, despite the theoretical effects of the states’ common colonial 
legacy.  
Notwithstanding the positive effects of such possibilities for the local population 
to continue their traditional way of living, the porous, dynamic and almost invisible borders of 
the CCS-region also enable extensive flows of armed forces, weaponry and military 
equipment. Placed in the hinterlands far from the military and administrative centers of the 
states; the porous and ungoverned national borders enable close cooperation between militias 
and rebel groups from all sides. Possibilities of seeking refugee and gathering military support 
from the neighbouring states are unlimited. Additionally, unfortunate socio-economic 
opportunities for impoverished stigmatized youths have furthered a significant number of 
unregulated combatants with highly fluid loyalties. Affected by military or political 
enticements and economic encouragements the combatants’ accession to militias and armed 
forces tends to be constantly shifting and depending on the at each moment most suitable 
alternative. Giroux et al explains the situation:  
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Cross-border trade has been important in the region, which is logical given 
that eastern Chad, north-eastern CAR and Darfur have been oriented more 
towards each other than towards their respective capitals. Indeed, there has 
been little restriction of cross-border movement of goods, as governments in 
the region lack the capacity to control their borders. This has facilitated the 
regionalization of conflict insofar as it has allowed trade of military material 
across the border. It has fostered the proliferation of small arms and the 
emergence of a pool of fluid combatants and fluid loyalties.
187
  
 
By acknowledging all these case-specific characteristics it is easily understood that the north-
eastern CAR is to a great extent practically cut off from the administrative, economic centre 
of Bangui. Under such conditions, which have remained almost indifferent since the colonial 
era with its clear socio-economic centralization around Bangui, it is hardly surprising that the 
north-eastern Vakaga province has become increasingly distanced from the capital during past 
decades. Taking into account the similarities of the situations apparent in Chad and Sudan, as 
well as the dynamics of the border-regions enabling transnational flows of peoples, 
equipment, refugees and militias, it becomes clear that the CCS-region is distanced not only 
cartographically and financially from the commercial and administrative centers of the CAR, 
Chad and Sudan, but also mentally and psychologically. In fact, rather than being conceived 
of as three provinces in three different states that are separately, but simultaneously, distanced 
from the respective capitals, the north-eastern CAR, eastern Chad and western Sudan should 
be considered to constitute a financial, infrastructural, societal, commercial and organizational 
region of its own, not least due to their common colonial heritage.  
  A direct consequence of the colonial impingement in Central Africa in the early 
20
th
 century was the political and administrative separation of the residents in the CCS-region 
and the subordination of them under the authorities of three geographically-, 
demographically- and politically distant capitals. Combining the just noted geo-political and 
socio-economic regionalized communality with the legacy of having been involuntary 
subjugated to distant authorities and the continuously underdeveloped and neglected social 
services of the region; it is unsurprising that the residents in the CCS-region have repeatedly 
gathered and turned against their respective governments throughout history. But when 
assessing the characteristics of the opposition and the features of the non-governmental armed 
forces the aspects just noted and described in section 3.5.2 must be taken into account. The 
armed forces are dynamic and constantly shifting. Military personnel and support are gathered 
in neighbouring states. Unregulated combatants’ loyalties are fluid, varying and their 
allegiances without national restrictions. Requirements of organized structures, responsible 
military commands and distinguishable combatants appear anything but fulfilled. Further, the 
non-governmental armed forces engage in combats and hostilities transgressing delimited 
territories, conducts raids in their neighbouring countries just as often as in their countries of 
origin and transfers military equipment and weaponry across borders without hindrance. 
Under these conditions; requirements on the parties involved in and the territorial scope of 
conflicts in line with the contemporary IHL, in particular the Geneva Conventions, are 
anything but fulfilled.  
 This is problematic not only when academically characterizing the conflict. It 
furthers significant practical dilemmas. Enlightened in sections 2.1 and 3.5 the international 
normative framework relies upon Westphalian territorial sovereignty. The territorial 
sovereignty sets the geographical and practical limits for the exertion of the states’ exclusive 
rights of using violence against the state’s population. Coercive exclusiveness and use of 
violence in order to maintain public security and national stability, usually conducted by a 
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state’s official military or police force, is thus closely tied to territorial sovereignty and 
national boundaries. There are two obvious issues of concern in relation to this when 
analyzing the belligerency occurring in the CCS-region. Firstly, in geographical terms; how 
far do one state’s rights and duties reach in a region where the territorial boundaries are 
considered highly porous and dynamic, if even existent? Where do one state’s exclusive 
sovereignty end and the neighbours’ take on? At which point does the exclusive right to act 
and the responsibilities of one state’s military turn into a duty to refrain from acting? 
Secondly and even more challenging; how to assert who is the righteous holder of the 
exclusive right to use force and violence in the hostilities, when the actors and parties 
involved in the conflict are intertwined to the extent outlined in the previous? When the 
governmental and non-governmental armed forces and militias are volatile, mixed, constantly 
varying and occasionally supporting each other beyond national limits, it appears almost 
impossible to distinguish who is the legitimate holder of the right to use violence. 
Consequently, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to assert accountability and criminal 
responsibility for misconducts, when even distinguishing who is a legitimate practitioner of 
violence and who is a perpetrator of illegitimate acts – is highly challenging. Some notes by 
Davis may function as final reflections in this regard: 
 
The existence of a wide range of individuals and groups using coercive force 
either defensively or offensively helps undermine the state’s longstanding 
monopoly over the means of coercion (…) The sub-national and 
transnational scope of these practices further challenges the legitimacy and 
sovereign authority of the nation-state (…) We are at risk of exiting a 
Westphalian world where most coercive force has been monopolized in the 
hands of nation-states, and entering a new epoch where local and 
transnational non-state actors take on those roles.
188
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4 Conclusion 
Post-colonial prolonged armed conflicts in the CCS-region are essentially effects of colonial 
delimitations drawn wantonly without consideration of original communities, dividing 
coherent societies and subsuming them under separate, distant authorities. The available 
humanitarian framework is compatible with those arbitrarily formed societies as the 
humanitarian framework and the therein inherently required context were concluded under the 
same presupposed Westphalian premises. The colonial pattern of squared territorial societies 
with straightly delimited populations – is compatible with a legal framework requiring exactly 
such squared territorial boundaries and clearly distinguishable actors. However, the legal 
framework requiring squared territorial boundaries and clearly distinguishable actors – is not 
as clearly compatible with the regionalized reality in the CCS-region, with closely intertwined 
communities, porous national boundaries and dynamic, constantly shifting armed forces. That 
the conflict is difficult to grasp in terms of international humanitarian law has deplorable 
consequences. The context in which it takes place makes it extraordinarily difficult to 
distinguish who are and who aren’t the holders of the exclusive right to use violence and 
coercion within the states. It is extremely hard to hold persons and groups accountable for 
misconduct and war crimes both nationally and internationally, when simply characterizing 
the persons and groups is in the nearest impossible. Consequently, horrific crimes against the 
civilian population may not only go unpunished, but continue as it appears unclear who 
should – and has the exclusive right – to end to the violence. Because IHL – both regarding 
the common dichotomy of IAC/NIAC as well as hybrid typologies of NIACs – presupposes 
and requires a specific Westphalian context, it is highly challenging to apply the normative 
framework to the events taking place in the CCS-region. The prolonged hostilities and 
currently sprawling conflict occurring in the Central African Republic and its surroundings 
constitutes a from previously recognized armed conflicts distinguished type of conflict; a 
post-colonial regionalized conflict – difficultly accessible from the perspective of 
contemporary international humanitarian law and furthering undesirable consequences for the 
international society.  
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